Related to Zero Knowledge Proofs, the advantage is that phone numbers need never be shared in cleartext, preempting whole classes of attacks. However, could be overkill for your needs, and I am not sure how well current techniques would scale.
It would be great if users don't have to share the actual number with the server, a hash or something like that but that would make it impossible to verify the number and verification is required to prevent spoofing.
Another way maybe is to have a trusted 3rd party (something like EFF, LetsEncrypt) that can be used by users to validate their numbers and applications can get the hashes from there.
We really need to rethink this “one corp owns all the keys and all servers” setup.
> Even better if it’s something I can self host or join into one from many servers (remember IRC? Good times).
I thought Threads only interoperates with Mastodon/the fediverse in some limited capacity. Did I miss some Bluesky integration announcement?
> highlights the risks associated with the centralization of instant messaging services
Any cervices, really
> Nearly half of all phone numbers that appeared in the 2021 Facebook data leak of 500 million phone numbers (caused by a scraping incident in 2018) were still active on WhatsApp. This highlights the enduring risks for leaked numbers (e.g., being targeted in scam calls) associated with such exposures.
Fascinating to me as this seems to imply that a phone number has a half-life of about 4-5 years (unless the fact of the leak persuaded a significant number of people to change their number, which I suppose is unlikely?)
I imagine that for some, it also contributes to a sense of identity, much the same way that a mailing address might.
Where do you live, and why do cell phone numbers cycle so quickly?
That seems to be the takeaway.
Centralization of just about anything is an issue, not just messaging.
However, users still want/need the kinds of advantages that we get from monopolies/centralization, and implementing them in distributed systems is really hard.
Would the world be better if we'd been saying "whats your public key?" instead of "whats your email?" in the 90s?
That was super nice.
I mean this as expression of technical feasibility and capability to achieve risk reduction with technical measures in an adequate amount of time.
Remember, that for the rest of the non-technical units out there the “digitization” and “IT implementation projects” fail on a massive scale.
Shit in shit out.
Whatever we trash FAANG for, any government has way more blowout.
Decentralization allows people to choose who they trust. Or rather requires them to really
No, it really doesn't, and not because I have any faith in the current US government, just because I've seen the way Meta relates to it.
yeah
I've never understood this idea that phone numbers shouldn't be protected the same as email addresses or other personal information.
Email, of course, has an unlimited number of possible addresses. Phone numbers are a dense space with limited parameter length. So it is easier to enumerate all phone numbers.
I assume it can be related to this leak? Knowing someone uses a service can increase the effectiveness of targeted phishing.
Interestingly it’s harder to block these senders that do not advertise a number on sms.
Since facebook didn't rate limit the researchers (or anyone else) it allowed them to collect a big dataset of publicly avilable information, so shame on facebook (as if they had any), but it's not like people's secret/private data was exposed. Nobody should be upset that the photo they uploaded and put on the internet as their public profile picture gets seen by somebody else. People who don't want their "sexual orientation, political views, drug use" or whatever known shouldn't put that in their profile where anyone and everyone can see it.
I agree that there should be rate limiting of some sort.
For example, while everybody can physically go to your house and look at it from the street, somebody setting a webcam up and pointing it at the same house from the same vantage point would be a very different story and is illegal in many jurisdictions as a result.
There are many alternatives to WhatsApp, you may want to try them. Briar, Ricochet Refresh, Session, Matrix (Element), Jabber (with OMEMO and whatnot), among many others.
What is this was not WhatsApp, but it was a website or service dedicated to something unethical or illegal or just extremely embarrassing? Something that could ruin a marriage or career if it was known someone was a registered user? Would it be OK if someone could punch in phone numbers to find out who is registered on these sites?
What if someone automated and correlated this information to produce a profile for a phone number of all the shady/embarrassing services that phone number is associated with?
they claim to have achieved a rate of 7,000/s, which is roughly 25M/h
i do agree that is an absurd amount, especially when paired with the lack of rate limiting as discussed in their paper.
> "[...] Moreover, we did not experience any prohibitive rate-limiting. With our query rate of 7,000 phone numbers per second (and session), we could confirm 3.5 B phone numbers registered on WhatsApp [...]"
prior to my initial comment, i was under the impression they had encountered ratelimiting and bypassed it, it appears this initial assumption was incorrect.
i agree that it is ridiculous, though i faulter on calling it a vulnerability as in my eyes that term is specifically for unintended side affects / exploitation.
Wouldn't that be the exact same privacy problem in effect? What's the practical difference between ineffective and no rate limiting?
assuming a reasonable ratelimit, say 100 lookups per day (maybe some exceptions if the lookup results in an account that already has you in contacts, idk) - this would significantly reduce the amount of scraping that can be done.
contact lookup is a required function of whatsapp, the issue this paper highlights is that there is no protection against mass scraping
Currently I'm waiting to hear from Whatsapp support and/or the 7 day waiting time to be over to reset my account. It is bizarre that I am not able to recover my account when I still own my phone number (I can still receive SMS on it).
I would consider myself very cautious about clicking suspicious links, of course one can never be 100% sure. This was very disconcerting.
As a reminder for all Whatsapp users, please set up your 2FA PINs and recovery emails.
What concerns me is that only thing stopping someone from enumerating the entire set of all possible phone numbers is effective server-side rate limiting. What are the current rate limits for each messenger, and are they sufficient? (per this paper, probably not)
They did and this was not enumeration, did you read post?
And yes the pictures were leaked in the process.
Also, from examining the published data set I found it interesting that there are only five WhatsApp users registered in North Korea. I wonder who they are.
My entire PII is already leaked elsewhere in other breaches.
Never gonna happen.
1. They collect all the metadata in unencrypted format and link it to phone numbers, making a huge social graph.
2. Backups are not encrypted by default and enabling of them is pushed. So the messages were never actually encrypted for most people and police can get messages without the actual phone.
3. iCloud E2EE backup fight in UK was mostly because of 2. as people started to opt-in for encryption.
That doesn't make any sense. Why did uk want to start a fight over icloud E2EE backups (opt-in) but not whatsapp E2EE backups (opt-in)?
Default iCloud backup always included WhatsApp too, even if it was disabled in the app or the app used encrypted backups. And many other things, so it was not only about WhatsApp. Even for WhatsApp alone, it was slightly more useful.
Nor were social security numbers.
But I suppose one could start a service, so you could pay them to look up a 3rd party's tax returns...
Of 10,000 received messages, perhaps 2 are spam?
What I find fascinating is that people paid for privacy. Yes, indeed, people paid several dollars extra per month to maintain an unlisted/unpublished phone number. Today very few people are willing to pay actual money for privacy.
Everyone I knew while growing up was in the white pages (parents) with home address, not just phone number.
The early “FreeNet” and ISPs like Compuserve used anonymous usernames. Personalized email addresses came later…
Oddly, because we can’t even pay for privacy today, it appears as if nobody cares. Sure, still desirable but not even an option at any cost.
How we got from there to here is troubling.
Proper research would be to identify an issue, write up the issue, conduct a handful of tests, report the issue. Improper research is enumerate the entire input space and gather as much data as you can from the target.
But since this is a civilian application and not military, it doesn't seem sensible to rate vulnerabilities according to military use. The intended scope of the application makes a huge difference legally and operationally and should be triaged accordingly.
It's still quite possible to discover a single or small set of existing WhatsApp users based on their phone number. So in your scenario the risk still exists, it's just more work to enumerate everyone. Everyone should still assume their phone number can be linked to their WhatsApp account.
But this has always been the case, the phone numbers are public, and phone numbers are the public key to whatsapp accounts.
Also you always could check a specific number to see if it is a whatsapp user. It is certainly an issue if a single actor can query 500 million users in a matter of minutes, and there seems to be some additional information per account like what device they are in. But these seem relatively minor.
What are you talking about? Like what is even the mechanism for your concern?
This is an open endpoint / not a part of the design that is intended to be confidential. If you suspected any particular individual you could always check if their phone number had a WA account.
If the application is actively distributed in a country and their usage is permitted by their Terms of Service, then yes Whatsapp is liable for the security of their users in that context. If however the application is not actively distributed in that country, and there are active measures like geolocalization (and asking the user what country they are from during signup) to avoid serving such countries, then usage in those countries is outside the scope of Whatsapp.
Furthermore Whatsapp is a civilian app and is not designed or guaranteed for military usage, it's outside the scope of whatsapp.
Can the technique be used as one tool of many (including a bullet) in order to kill someone? Yes, is this a deadly security vulnerability? No, of course not, that's reaching, I'm not sure what would compel these exaggerations, maybe the larping, maybe its a general hatred towards whatsapp and you just jump on any opportunity to release your pent up anger.
It's worth noting that there's a gap between the security capabilities of whatsapp and the security capabilities they are legally required to have. Whatsapp will no doubt patch this small issue and keep that gap, but WA as it stands is one of the most secure and widely used applications in the world, has had an almost impollute historical record which is why billions of users trust the application with personal and professional secrets.
P.S: Also, you always could find out if a phone number is a whatsapp user individually, just add them on whatsapp and try to message them.
Do you work for Meta?
People don't use WhatsApp because it's so secure. In certain countries people started using it because it was the first app that was cheaper than SMS and now they use it because everybody else is still using it. There is no other significant reason.
They have a history of security issues going back to 2011 when you could take over other peoples account. Today is just the last story of this ugly and leaking brother to Signal. The actually "most secure" app out there.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1692122
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25662215
I get this is snarky and it being HN I'll now collect my downvotes, but really, I can't not hear Whatsapp without also thinking Facebook; the entire product may as well be a security vuln
To be honest, I couldn’t imagine a word more related than "open source". Isn’t that junction literally the acronym F/LOSS?