Sure, there are sensible things that could be done with this. But given the background of the people involved, the fact that this is yet another clear profit-first gathering makes me incredibly pessimistic.
This pessimism is made worse by reading the answers of the founders here in this thread: typical corporate talk. And most importantly: preventing the very real dangers involved is clearly not a main goal, but is instead brushed off with empty platitudes like "I've been a FOSS guy my entire adult life...." instead of describing or considering actual preventive measures. And even if the claim was true, the founders had a real love for the hacker spirit, there is obviously nothing stopping them from selling to the usual suspects and golden parachute out.
I was really struggling to not make this comment just another snarky, sarcastic comment, but it is exhausting. It is exhausting to see the hatred some have for people just owning their hardware. So sorry, "don't worry, we're your friends" just doesn't cut it to come at this with a positive attitude.
The benefits are few, the potential to do a lot of harm is large. And the people involved clearly have the network and connections to make this an instrument of user-hostility.
Of course, we’ll see if anybody is actually engaging with this idea in good faith when it all gets rolled out. Because the bank has full end-to-end control over the device, authentication will be fully their responsibility and the (basically bullshit in the first place) excuse of “your identity was stolen,” will become not-a-thing.
Obviously I would not pay for such a device (and will always have a general purpose computer that runs my own software), but if the bank or Netflix want to send me a locked down terminal to act as a portal to their services, I guess I would be fine with using it to access (just) their services.
It would quickly get out of hand if every online service started to do the same though. But, if remote device attestation continues to be pushed and we continue to have less and less control and ownership over our devices, I definitely see a world where I now carry two phones. One running something like GrapheneOS, connected to my own self-hosted services, and a separate "approved" phone to interact with public and essential services as they require crap like play integrity, etc.
But at the end of the day, I still fail see why this is even a need. Governments, banks, other entities have been providing services over the web for decades at this point with little issue. Why are we catering to tech illiteracy (by restricting ownership) instead of promoting tech education and encouraging people to both learn, and importantly, take responsibility for their own actions and the consequences of those actions.
"Someone fell for a scam and drained their bank account" isn't a valid reason to start locking down everyone's devices.
Most banks already do that. The secure, locked down terminals are called ATMs and they are generally placed at assorted convenient locations in most cities.
This is not a question of missing tech.
If the bank can't be bothered to either implement support for U2F or else clearly articulate why U2F isn't sufficient then they don't have a valid position. Anything else they say on the matter should be disregarded.
In this way, the banks are asserting control over your device. It's beyond authentication, they are saying "If you have full control over your device, you cannot access our services."
I'll agree with you that they don't have a valid position, because I can just as easily open up a web browser on said rooted device and access just fine via the web, but how long until services move away from web interfaces in favor of apps instead to assert more control?
Keep in mind that the businesses pushing this stuff still don't support U2F by and large. When I can go down in person to enroll a hardware token I might maybe consider listening to what they have to say on the subject. Maybe. (But probably not.)
Or, hasn’t there been malware that periodically takes screenshots of the device? Or maybe that’s a Hollywood plot, I forget actually.
By the time you reach the point that the user is doggedly following harmful step by step instructions over the course of multiple callbacks there is nothing short of a padded cell that can protect him from himself.
Unless you mean to suggest somehow screening such calls? A local LLM? Literal wiretapping via realtime upload to the cloud? If facing such a route society would likely be better off institutionalizing anyone victimized in such a manner.
Yeah, it's called Recall and its baked into Windows as a "feature."
>What exactly is the concern here?
Stealer malware. Or even RATs where attackers get notified when you open a sensitive app and they can take over after you have authenticated.
MitM via an evil (ie incorrect) domain name is prevented because U2F (and now webauthn or CTAP2) are origin bound.
RATs? On stock android? How does that work? And how are the things you describe not also threats for online banking via a browser? It's certainly not how the vast majority of attacks take place in the wild. Can you provide any examples of such an attack (ie malware as opposed to phishing) that was widespread? Otherwise I assume we're writing a script for Hollywood here.
Even then, a RAT could be trivially defeated by requiring a second one-off token authentication for any transaction that would move money around. I doubt there'd be much objection to such a policy. If people really hate it let them opt out below an amount of their choosing by signing a liability waiver.
This is assuming the user's device is not compromised.
>How does that work?
Priviledge escalation on an old OS version allows an attacker to get root access. Then with that they can bypass any sandboxing. Or they could get access to some android permission intended for system apps that they should not have access to and use that to do malicous things.
I don't closely follow malware outbreaks for android so I can't point to specific examples, but malware does exist.
> Priviledge escalation on an old OS version allows an attacker to get root access.
At which point hardware attestation accomplishes nothing. Running in an enclave might but attesting the OS image that was used to boot most certainly won't.
Many consumers use older devices. Any banking app is forced to support them or they will lose customers. There's no way around that. (It doesn't matter anyway because these sorts of attacks simply aren't commonplace.)
> but malware does exist.
I didn't ask for an example of malware. I asked you to point to an example of a widespread attack against secured accounts using malware as a vector. You have invented some utterly unrealistic scenario that simply isn't a concern in the real world for a consumer banking interaction.
You're describing the sort of high effort targeted attack utilizing one or more zero days that a high level government official might be subject to.
Attestation could be used to say that the user is not using a secure version of the OS That has known vulnerabilities patched.
>Any banking app is forced to support them or they will lose customers.
Remote attestation is just one of the many signals used for detecting fraud.
>one or more zero days
Many phones are not on an OS getting security updates. Whether that be due to age or the vendor not distributing the security patches. Even using old exploits malware can work.
Citation needed. The fact that the infosec industry just keeps growing YoY kinda suggests that there are in fact issues that are more expensive than paying the security companies.
This entire shit storm is 100% driven by the music, film, and tv industries, who are desperate to eke a few more millions in profit from the latest Marvel snoozefest (or whatever), and who tried to argue with a straight face that they were owed more than triple the entire global GDP [0].
These people are the enemy. They do not care about about computing freedom. They don't care about you or I at all. They only care about increasing profits via and they're using the threat of locking people out of Netflix via HDCP and TPM, in order to force remote attestation on everyone.
I don't know what the average age on HN is, but I came up in the 90s when "fuck corporations" and "information wants to be free" still formed a large part of the zeitgeist, and it's absolutely infuriating to see people like TFfounders actively building things that will measurably make things worse for everyone except the C-suite class. So much for "hacker spirit".
[0] https://globalnews.ca/news/11026906/music-industry-limewire-...
These guys pathologically have had a chip on their shoulder since Napster.
The integrity of a system being verified/verifiable doesn't imply that the owner of the system doesn't get to control it.
This sort of e2e attestation seems really useful for enterprise or public infrastructure. Like, it'd be great to know that the ATMs or transit systems in my city had this level of system integrity.
You argument correctly points out that attestation tech can be used to restrict software freedom, but it also assumes that this company is actively pursuing those use cases. I don't think that is a given.
At the end of the day, as long as the owner of the hardware gets to control the keys, this seems like fantastic tech.
Once it's out there and normalized, the individual engineers don't get to control how it is used. They never do.
The problem is that there are powerful corporate and government interests who would love nothing more than to prevent users from controlling the keys for their own computers, and they can make their dream come true simply by passing a law.
It may be the case that certain users want to ensure that their computers are only running their code. But the same technologies can also used to ensure that their computers are only running someone else's code, locking users out from their own devices.
By that logic, we should just turn off the internet. Too much potential for evil there.
More seriously, the argument being presented seems to just be "attestation tech has been used for evil in the past, therefore all attestation tech is bad," which is obviously an unsound argument. A sound argument would have to show that attestation tech is _inherently_ bad, and I've already provided examples that I think effectively counter that. I can provide more if needed.
I get that we want to prevent attestation tech from being used for evil, but that's a regulatory problem, not a technical one. You make this point by framing the evil parties as "corporate and government interests."
Don't get me wrong, I am fully against anything that limits the freedoms of the person that owns the device. I just don't see how any of this is a valid argument that Amutable's mission is bad/immoral/invalid.
Or maybe another argument that's perhaps more aligned with the FOSS ideology: if I want e2e attestation of the software stack on my own devices, isn't this a good thing for me?
The building blocks are already there for a sufficiently motivated user to build their own verified OS image. Google has been doing that with ChromeOS for years. The danger I see is that once there is a low-friction, turnkey solution for locking down general purpose systems, then the battle for control over users' devices reduces to control over the keys. That is much easier for well-heeled interests to dominate than outlawing Linux outright.
The status quo is a large population of unverified but fully user-configurable systems. While the ideal end state is a large population of verified and fully user-configurable systems, it is more likely that the tools for achieving that outcome will be co-opted by corporate and political interests to bend the population toward verified and un-configurable systems. That outcome would be far worse than the status quo.
Every time you perform an attestation the public key (and certificate) is divulged which makes it a unique identifier, and one that can be traced to the point of sale - and when buying a used device, a point of resale as the new owner can be linked to the old one.
They make an effort to increase privacy by using intermediaries to convert the identifier to an ephemeral one, and use the ephemeral identifier as the attestation key.
This does not change the fact that if the party you are attesting to gets together with the intermediary they will unmask you. If they log the attestations and the EK->AIK conversions, the database can be used to unmask you in the future.
Also note that nothing can prevent you from forging attestations if you source a private-public key pair and a valid certificate, either by extracting them from a compromised device or with help from an insider at the factory. DRM systems tend to be separate from the remote attestation ones but the principles are virtually identical. Some pirate content producers do their deeds with compromised DRM private keys.
People dislike cash for some strange reason, then complain about tracking. People also hand out their mobile number like candy. Same issue.
In my case it is because I would never have the right amount with me, in the right denominations. Google Pay always has this covered.
Also you need to remember to take one more thing with you, and refill it occasionally. As opposed to fuel, you do not know how much you will need when.
It can get lost or destroyed, and is not (usually) replaceable.
I am French, currently in the US. I need to change 100 USD in small denominations, I will need to go to the bank, and they will hopefully do that for me. Or not. Or not without some official paper from someone.
Ah yes, and I am in the US and the Euro is not an accepted currency here. So I need to take my 100 € to a bank and hope I can get 119.39 USD. In the right denominations.
What will I do with the 34.78 USD left when I am back home? I have a chest of money from all over the world. I showed it once to my kids when they were young, told a bit about the world and then forgot about it.
Money also weights quite a lot. And when it does not weights it gets lost or thrown away with some other papers. Except if they are neatly folded in a wallet, which I will forget.
I do not care about being traced when going to the supermarket. If I need to do untraceable stuff I will get money from teh ATM. Ah crap, they will trace me there.
So the only solution is to get my salary in cash, whihc is forbidden in France. Or take some small amounts from time to time. Which I will forget, and I have better things to do.
Cash sucks.
Sure, if we go cashless and terrible things happen (cyberwar, solar flare, software issues) then we are screwed. But either the situation unscrews itself, or we will have much, much, much bigger issues than money -- we will need to go full survival mode, apocalypse movies-style.
Which does exactly what I said. Full zero knowledge attestation isn't practical as a single compromised key would give rise to a service that would serve everyone.
The solution first adopted by the TCG (TPM specification v1.1) required a trusted third-party, namely a privacy certificate authority (privacy CA). Each TPM has an embedded RSA key pair called an Endorsement Key (EK) which the privacy CA is assumed to know. In order to attest the TPM generates a second RSA key pair called an Attestation Identity Key (AIK). It sends the public AIK, signed by EK, to the privacy CA who checks its validity and issues a certificate for the AIK. (For this to work, either a) the privacy CA must know the TPM's public EK a priori, or b) the TPM's manufacturer must have provided an endorsement certificate.) The host/TPM is now able to authenticate itself with respect to the certificate. This approach permits two possibilities to detecting rogue TPMs: firstly the privacy CA should maintain a list of TPMs identified by their EK known to be rogue and reject requests from them, secondly if a privacy CA receives too many requests from a particular TPM it may reject them and blocklist the TPMs EK. The number of permitted requests should be subject to a risk management exercise. This solution is problematic since the privacy CA must take part in every transaction and thus must provide high availability whilst remaining secure. Furthermore, privacy requirements may be violated if the privacy CA and verifier collude. Although the latter issue can probably be resolved using blind signatures, the first remains.
It seems apple has a service, with an easily rotated key and an agreement with providers. If the key _Apple_ uses is compromised, they can rotate it.
BUT, apple knows _EXACTLY_ who I am. I attest to them using my hardware, they know _EXACTLY_ which hardware I'm using. They can ban me or my hardware. They then their centralized service gives me a blind token. But apple, may, still know exactly who owns which blind tokens.
However, I cannot generate blind tokens on my own. I _MUST_ talk to some centralized service that can I identify me. If that is not the case, then any single compromised device can generate infinite blind tokens rending all the tokens useless.
I don't know if that's what Apple actually does. If it is, once it gets popular enough as an anti-bot measure there may be farms of Apple devices selling these tokens. It's a separate system from remote attestation anyhow.
It would be sufficient to be able to freely choose who you trust as proxy for your attestations *and* the ability to modify that choice at any point later (i.e. there should be some interoperability). That can be your Google/Apple/Samsung ecosystem, your local government, a company operating in whatever jurisdiction you are comfortable with, etc.
I.e. from when they buy from a trusted source and init the device.
Or why buy used devices if this is a risk?
Hardware fingerprinting in general is a difficult thing to protect from - and in an active probing scenario where two apps try to determine if they are on the same device it's all but impossible. But having a tattletale chip in your CPU an API call away doesn't make the problem easier. Especially when it squawks manufacturer traceable serials.
Remote attestation requires collusion with an intermediary at least, DRM such as Widevine has no intermediaries. You expose your HWID (Widevine public key & cert) directly to the license server of which there are many and under the control of various entities (Google does need to authorize them with certificates). And this is done via API, so any app in collusion with any license server can start acquiring traceable smartphone serials.
Using Widevine for this purpose breaks Google's ToS but you would need to catch an app doing it (and also intercept the license server's certificate) and then prove it which may be all but impossible as an app doing it could just have a remote code execution "vulnerability" and request Widevine license requests in a targeted or infrequent fashion. Note that any RCE exploit in any app would also allow this with no privilege escalation.
Remote attestation shifts trust from user-controlled software to manufacturer‑controlled hardware identity.
It's a gun with a serial number. The Fast and Furious scandal of the Obama years was traced and proven with this kind of thing
There's not really an equivalent here for a computer owned by an individual because it's totally normal for someone to sell or dispose of a computer, and no one expects someone to be responsible for who else might get their hands on it at that point. If you prove a criminal owns a computer that I owned before, then what? Prosecution for failing to protect my computer from thieves, or for reselling it, or gifting it to a neighbor or family friend? Shifting the trust doesn't matter if what gets exposed isn't actually damaging on any way, and that's what the parent comment is asking about.
The first two examples you give seem to be about an unscrupulous government punishing someone for owning a computer that they consider tainted, but it honestly doesn't seem that believable that a government who would do that would require a burden of proof so high as to require cryptographic attestation to decide on something like that. I don't have a rebuttal for "an organization trying to avoid cross-tenant linkage" though because I'm not sure I even understand what it means: an example would probably be helpful.
Whereas the state of the system as a whole immediately after it boots can be attested with secure boot and a TPM sealed secret. No manufacturer keys involved (at least AFAIK).
I'm not actually clear which this is. Are they doing something special for runtime integrity? How are you even supposed to confirm that a system hasn't been compromised? I thought the only realistic way to have any confidence was to reboot it.
To anyone thinking not possibile, we already switched inits to systemd. And being persnickety saw mariadb replace mysql everywhere, libreoffice replace open office, and so on.
All the recent pushiness by a certain zealotish Italian debian maintainer, only helps this case. Trying to degrade Debian into a clone of Redhat is uncooth.
This misunderstands why systemd succeeded. It included several design decisions aimed at easing distribution maintainers' burdens, thus making adoption attractive to the same people that would approve this adoption.
If a systemd fork differentiates on not having attestation and getting rid of an unspecified set of "all the silly parts", how would they entice distro maintainers to adopt it? Elaborating what is meant by "silly parts" would be needed to answer that question.
Look at all the kernel patch submissions. 90% are not users but big tech drones. Look at the Linux foundation board. It's the who's who of big tech.
This is why I moved to the BSDs. Linux started as a grassroots project but turned commercial, the BSDs started commercial but are hardly still used as such and are mostly user driven now (yes there's a few exceptions like netflix, netgate, ix etc but nothing on the scale of huawei, Amazon etc)
A lot more programs are available for linux, drivers and subsystems have gotten better, more features that benefit everyone (such as eBPF) and more
Open source operating systems are not a zero sum game. Yes there is a certain gravitational pull from all the work contributed by the big companies. If you aren't contributing "for-hire", then you choose what you want to work on, and what you want to use.
Thanks, this may be the key takeaway from this discussion for me
Like John Deere. Read about how they use that sort of thing
This «Linux have a finger in every pie» attitude is very harmful for industry, IMHO.
It's definitely pretty opinionated, and I frequently have to explain to people why "After=" doesn't mean "Wants=", but the result is way more robust than any alternative I'm familiar with.
If you're on a system so constrained that running systemd is a burden, you are probably already using something like buildroot/yocto and have a high degree of control about what init system you use.
You already trust third parties, but there is no reason why that third party can't be the very same entity publishing the distribution. The role corporations play in attestation for the devices you speak of can be displaced by an open source developer, it doesn't need to require a paid certificate, just a trusted one. Furthermore, attestation should be optional at the hardware level, allowing you to build distros that don't use it, however distros by default should use it, as they see fit of course.
I think what people are frustrated with is the heavy-handedness of the approach, the lack of opt-out and the corporate-centric feel of it all. My suggestion would be not to take the systemd approach. There is no reason why attestation related features can't be turned on or off at install time, much like disk encryption. I find it unfortunate that even something like secureboot isn't configurable at install time, with custom certs,distro certs, or certs generated at install time.
Being against a feature that benefits regular users is not good, it is more constructive to talk about what the FOSS way of implementing a feature might be. Just because Google and Apple did it a certain way, it doesn't mean that's the only way of doing it.
I would love to use that technology to do reverse attestation, and require the server that handles my personal data to behave a certain way, like obeying the privacy policy terms of the EULA and not using my data to train LLMs if I so opted out. Something tells me that's not going to happen...
Centralized trust Hardware attestation run by third parties creates a single point of trust (and failure). If one vendor controls what’s “trusted,” Linux loses one of its core properties: decentralization. This is a fundamental shift in the threat model.
Misaligned incentives These companies don’t just care about security. They have financial, legal, and political incentives. Over time, that usually means monetization, compliance pressure, and policy enforcement creeping into what started as a “security feature.”
Black boxes Most attestation systems are opaque. Users can’t easily audit what’s being measured, what data is emitted, or how decisions are made. This runs counter to the open, inspectable nature of Linux security today.
Expanded attack surface Adding external hardware, firmware, and vendor services increases complexity and creates new supply-chain and implementation risks. If the attestation authority is compromised, the blast radius is massive.
Loss of user control Once attestation becomes required (or “strongly encouraged”), users lose the ability to fully control their own systems. Custom kernels, experimental builds, or unconventional setups risk being treated as “untrusted” by default.
Vendor lock-in Proprietary attestation stacks make switching vendors difficult. If a company disappears, changes terms, or decides your setup is unsupported, you’re stuck. Fragmentation across vendors also becomes likely.
Privacy and tracking Remote attestation often involves sending unique or semi-unique device signals to external services. Even if not intended for tracking, the capability is there—and history shows it eventually gets used.
Potential for abuse Attestation enables blacklisting. Whether for business, legal, or political reasons, third parties gain the power to decide what software or hardware is acceptable. That’s a dangerous lever to hand over.
Harder incident response If something goes wrong inside a proprietary attestation system, users and distro maintainers may have little visibility or ability to respond independently.
Then the user can put their own key there (if say corporate policies demand it), but there is no 3rd party that can decide what the device can do.
But having 3rd party (and US one too!) that is root of all trust is a massive problem.
The giveaway is that LLMs love bulleted lists with a bolded attention-grabbing phrase to start each line. Copy-pasting directly to HN has stripped the bold formatting and bullets from the list, so the attention-grabbing phrase is fused into the next sentence, e.g. “Potential for abuse Attestation enables blacklisting”
It's also because content companies and banks want other people in suits to trust.
I've been a FOSS guy my entire adult life, I wouldn't put my name to something that would enable the kinds of issues you describe.
History is pretty consistent here:
WhatsApp: privacy-first, founders with principles, both left once monetization and policy pressure kicked in.
Google: 'Don’t be evil' didn’t disappear by accident — it became incompatible with scale, revenue, and government relationships.
Facebook/Meta: years of apologies and "we'll do better," yet incentives never changed.
Mobile OS attestation (iOS / Android): sold as security, later became enforcement and gatekeeping.
Ruby on Rails ecosystem: strong opinions, benevolent control, then repeated governance, security, and dependency chaos once it became critical infrastructure. Good intentions didn't prevent fragility, lock-in, or downstream breakage.
Common failure modes:
Enterprise customers demand guarantees - policy creeps in.
Governments demand compliance - exceptions appear.
Liability enters the picture - defaults shift to "safe for the company."
Revenue depends on trust decisions - neutrality erodes.
Core maintainers lose leverage - architecture hardens around control.
Even if keys are user-controlled today, the key question is architectural: Can this system resist those pressures long-term, or does it merely promise to?
Most systems that can become centralized eventually do, not because engineers change, but because incentives do. That’s why skepticism here isn't personal — it's based on pattern recognition.
I genuinely hope this breaks the cycle. History just suggests it's much harder than it looks.
I can understand corporate use case - the person with access to the machine is not its owner, and corporation may want to ensure their property works the way they expect it to be. Not something I care about, personally.
But when it’s a person using their own property, I don’t quite get the practical value of attestation. It’s not a security mechanism anymore (protecting a person from themselves is an odd goal), and it has significant abuse potential. That happened to mobile, and the outcome was that users were “protected” from themselves, that is - in less politically correct words - denied effective control over their personal property, as larger entities exercised their power and gated access to what became de-facto commonplace commodities by forcing to surrender any rights. Paired with awareness gap the effects were disastrous, and not just for personal compute.
So, what’s the point and what’s the value?
Of course you can already do the above with secure boot coupled with a CPU that implements an fTPM. So I can't speak to the value of this project specifically, only build and boot integrity in general. For example I have no idea what they mean by the bullet "runtime integrity".
And that’s why I said “not a security mechanism”. Attestation is for protecting against actors with local hardware access. I have FDE and door locks for that already.
Given secure boot and a TPM you can remotely attest, using your own keys, that the system booted up to a known good state. What exactly that means though depends entirely on what you configured the image to contain.
> it won’t protect from malicious updates to configuration files
It will if you include the verified correct state of the relevant config file in a merkel tree.
> It won’t let me run arbitrary binaries (putting a nail to any local development), or if it will - it would be a temporary security theater (as attackers would reuse the same processes to sign their malware).
Shouldn't it permit running arbitrary binaries that you have signed? That places the root of trust with the build environment.
Now if you attempt to compile binaries and then sign them on the production system yeah that would open you up to attack (if we assume a process has been compromised at runtime). But wasn't that already the case? Ideally the production system should never be used to sign anything. (Some combination of SGX, TPM, and SEV might be an exception to that but I don't know enough to say.)
> Attestation is for protecting against actors with local hardware access. I have FDE and door locks for that already.
If you remotely boot a box sitting in a rack on the other side of the world how can you be sure it hasn't been compromised? However you go about confirming it, isn't that what attestation is?
Production servers are a whole different story - it's usually not my hardware to begin with. But given how things are mostly immutable those days (shipped as images rather than installed the old-fashioned sysadmin way), I'm not really sure what to think of it...
Granted these technologies can also be abused. But that involves running third party binaries that require SGX or other DRM measures before they will unlock or decrypt content or etc. Or querying a security element to learn who signed the image that was originally booted. Devices that support those things are already widespread. I don't think that's what this project is supposed to be. (Although I could always be wrong. There's almost no detail provided.)
This is for example dm-verity (e.g. `/usr/` is an erofs partiton with matching dm-verity). Lennart always talks about either having files be RW (backed by encryption) or RX (backed by kernel signature verification).
https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/security-in-qubes/an... For laptops, it helps make tampering obvious. (a different attestation scheme with smaller scope however)
This might not be useful to you personally, however.
Anyway, "full control over your keys" isn't the issue, it's the way that normalization of this kind of attestation will enable corporations and governments to infringe on traditional freedoms and privacy. People in an autocratic state "have full control over" their identity papers, too.
Until you get acquired, receive a golden parachute and use it when realizing that the new direction does not align with your views anymore.
But, granted, if all you do is FOSS then you will anyway have a hard time keeping evil actors from using your tech for evil things. Might as well get some money out of it, if they actually dump money on you.
A rational and intelligent engineer cannot possibly believe that he'll be able to control what a technology is used for after he creates it, unless his salary depends on him not understanding it.
Argument should be technical.
Yes. You correctly stated the important point.
Attestation of what to whom for which purpose? Which freedom does it allow users to control their keys, how does it square with remote attestation and the wishes of enterprise users?
Better security is good in theory, as long as the user maintains control and the security is on the user end. The last thing we need is required ID linked attestation for accessing websites or something similar.
it will be railroaded through in the same way that systemD was railroaded onto us.
If user control of keys becomes the linchpin for retaining full control over one's own computer, doesn't it become easy for a lobby or government to exert control by banning user-controlled keys? Today, such interest groups would need to ban Linux altogether to achieve such a result.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
FOR NOW. Policies and laws always change. Corporations and governments somehow always find ways to work against their people, in ways which are not immediately obvious to the masses. Once they have a taste of this there's no going back.
Please have a hard and honest think on whether you should actually build this thing. Because once you do, the genie is out and there's no going back.
This WILL be used to infringe on individual freedoms.
The only question is WHEN? And your answer to that appears to be 'Not for the time being'.
It would be a lot more reassuring if we knew what the business model actually was, or indeed anything else at all about this. I remain somewhat confused as to the purpose of this announcement when no actual information seems to be forthcoming. The negative reactions seen here were quite predictable, given the sensitive topic and the little information we do have.
PE or EIT?
Suppose you wanted to identify potential agitators by scanning all communication for indications in a fascist state one could require this technology in all trusted environments and require such an environment to bank, connect to an ISP, or use Netflix.
One could even imagine a completely benign usage which only identified actual wrong doing alongside another which profiled based almost entirely on anti regime sentiment or reasonable discontent.
The good users would argue that the only problem with the technology is its misuse but without the underlying technology such misuse is impossible.
One can imagine two entirely different parallel universes one in which a few great powers went the wrong way in part enabled by trusted computing and the pervasive surveillance enabled by the capability of AI to do the massive and boring task of analyzing a massive glut of ordinary behaviour and communication + tech and law to ensure said surveillance is carried out.
Even those not misusing the tech may find themselves worse off in such a world.
Why again should we trust this technology just because you are a good person?
- your bank won't let you log in from an "insecure" device.
- you won't be able to play videos on an "insecure" device.
- you won't be able to play video games on an "insecure" device.
And so on, and so forth.
The attestation portion of those systems is happening on locked down devices, and if you gain ownership of the devices they no longer attest themselves.
This is the curse of the duopoly of iOS and Android.
BankID in Sweden will only run with one of these devices, they used to offer a card system but getting one seems to be impossible these days. So you're really stuck with a mobile device as your primary means of identification for banking and such.
There's a reason that general purpose computers are locked to 720p on Netflix and Disney+; yet AppleTV's are not.
Now, if you want to use your phone as a debit/credit card substitute that is different (Google Pay cares, and I don't use it thus).
Anyway, why should banking apps care? It is not like they care when I use the bank from Firefox on my Linux laptop.
"Any bank"? Although the bank I use locks NFC payments behind such checks (which is not a big loss since a physical debit card offers the same functionality), anything else still works otherwise. Most of the things are available through the website (which fits well on mobile too), and mobile BLIK payments can be done from the Android app which works inside Waydroid with microG.
There's no reason other banks can't work the same way and it's outraging when they don't. Look around for a better bank.
The way you defeat things like that is through political maneuvering and guile rather than submission to their artificial narrative. Publish your own papers and documentation that recommends apps not support any device with that feature or require it to be off because it allows malware to use the feature to evade malware scans, etc. Or point out that it prevents devices with known vulnerabilities from being updated to third party firmware with the patch because the OEM stopped issuing patches but the more secure third party firmware can't sign an attestation, i.e. the device that can do the attestation is vulnerable and the device that can't is patched.
The way you break the duopoly is by getting open platforms that refuse to support it to have enough market share that they can't ignore it. And you have to solve that problem before they would bother supporting your system even if you did implement the treachery. Meanwhile implementing it makes your network effect smaller because then it only applies to the devices and configurations authorized to support it instead of every device that would permissionlessly and independently support ordinary open protocols with published specifications and no gatekeepers.
Another point is (often )the apps that banks makes are 3rd party developed by outsourcing (even if within the same developed country). If someone uses some MiTM or logcat to see some traffic and publishes it then banks get bad publicity. So to prevent this the banks, devs tell anything that is not normal (i.e) non-stock ROM is bad.
FOSS is also something many app-based software devs don't like on their products. While people in cloud, infra like it the app devs like these tools while developing or building a company but not when making end resulting apps.
It doesn't really provide any security.
On top of that, there are tons of devices that can pass attestation that have known vulnerabilities, so the attacker could just use one of those (or extract the keys from it) if they had any reason to. But in the mobile banking threat model they don't actually need to.
I think ever compute professional needs to spend at least a year trying to secure a random companies windows network to appreciate how impossible this actually is without hardware based roots of trust like TPMs and HSMs
It's not. Mobile applications just don't have unrestricted access to everything in your user directory, attestation have nothing to do with it.
Even if you stopped supporting desktops, then they would just reverse engineer the mobile app instead of the web app and extract the attestation keys from any unpatched model of phone and still run their code on a server, and then it would show up as "mobile fraud" because they're pretending to be a phone instead of a desktop, when in reality it was always a server rather than a phone or a desktop.
And even if attestation actually worked (which it doesn't), that still wouldn't prevent fraud, because it only tries to prove that the person requesting the transfer is using a commercial device. If the user's device is compromised then it doesn't matter if it can pass attestation because the attacker is only running the fake, credential stealing "bank app" on the user's device, not the real bank app. Then they can run the official bank app on an official device and use the stolen credentials to transfer the money. The attestation buys you nothing.
Also IIRC, linux foundation etc are not interested in doing such standardisations.
However the problem is that A LOT of things only work with the mobile app.
Of course its all nonsense make believe, the "trust root" is literally a Microsoft signed stub. For this dummy implementation you can't modify your own kernel anymore.
Finances, just pay everything by cheque or physical pennies. Fight back. Starve the tyrants to death where you can, force the tyrants to incur additional costs and inefficiencies where you can't.
the anti-user attestation will at least be full of security holes, and likely won't work at all
It took us nearly a decade and a half to unfuck the pulseaudio situation and finally arrive at a simple solution (pipewire).
SystemD has a lot more people refining it down but a clean (under the hood) implementation probably won't be witnessed in my lifetime.
don't get me wrong, i use pipewire all day every day, and wrote one of the APIs (JACK) that it implements (pretty well, too!).
but pipewire is an order of magnitude more complex than pulseaudio.
My 0.02 bits.
for systemd, I don't think I have a single linux system that boots/reboots reliably 100% of the time these days
What set systemd apart is the collection of tightly integrated utilities such as a dns resolver, sntp client, core dump handler, rpc-like api linking to complex libraries in the hot path and so on and so forth that has been a constant stream of security exploits for over a decade now.
This is a case where the critics were proven to be right. Complexity increases the cognitive burden.
I think he will succeed and we will be worse off, collectively.
For example, the part of systemd that fills DNS will put them in random order (like actual random, not "code happened to dump it in map order)
The previous, while very much NOT perfect, system, put the DNSes in order of one in latest interface, which had useful side-feature that if your VPN had different set of DNSes, it got added in front
The systemd one just randomizes it ( https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/27543 ) which means that using standard openvpn wrapper script for it will need to be reran sometimes few times to "roll" the right address, I pretty much have to run
systemctl restart systemd-resolved ; sleep 1 ; cat /etc/resolv.conf
The OTHER problem is pervasive NIH in codebase.
Like, they decided to use binary log format. Okay, I can see advantages, it can be indexed or sharded for faster access to app's files...
oh wait it isn't, if you want to get last few lines of a service the worst case is "mmap every single journal file for hundreds of MBs of reads"
It can be optimized so some long but constant fields like bootid are not repeated...
oh wait it doesn't do that either, is massively verbose. I guess I can understand it, at least that would make it less crash-proof...
oh wait no, after crash it just spams logs that previous log file is corrupted and it won't be used.
So we have a log format that only systemd tools can read, takes few times as much space per line as text or even JSON version would, and it still craps out on unclean shutdown
They could've just integrated SQLite. Hell I literally made a lil prototype that took journalctl logs and wrote it to indexed SQLite file and it was not only faster but smaller (as there is no need to write bootid with each line, and log lines can be sharded or indexed so lookup is faster). But nah, Mr. Poettering always wanted to make a binary log format so he did.
The people who had no issues with Pulseaudio; used a mainstream distribution. Those distributions did the heavy lifting of making sure stuff fit together in a cohesive way.
SystemD is very opinionated, so you'd assume it wouldn't have the same results, but it does.. if you use a popular distro then they've done a lot of the hard work that makes systemd function smooth.
I was today years old when I realised this is true for both bits of poetter-ware. Weird.
pulseaudio I had to fight every single day, with my "exotic" setup of one set of speakers and a headset
with pipewire, I've never had to even touch it
systemd: yesterday I had a network service on one machine not start up because the IP it was trying to bind to wasn't available yet
the dependencies for the .service file didn't/can't express the networking semantics correctly
this isn't some hacked up .service file I made, it's that from an extremely popular package from a very popular distro
(yeah I know, use a socket activated service......... more tight coupling to the garbage software)
the day before that I had a service fail to start because the wall clock was shifted by systemd-timesyncd during startup, and then the startup timeout fired because the clock advanced more than the timeout
then the week before that I had a load of stuff start before the time was synced, because chrony has some weird interactions with time-sync.target
it's literally a new random problem every other boot because of this non-deterministic startup, which was never a problem with traditional init or /etc/rc
for what? to save maybe a second of boot time
if the distro maintainers don't understand the systemd dependency model after a decade then it's unfit for purpose
This gave me a good chuckle. Systemd literally was created to solve the awful race conditions and non-determinism in other init systems. And it has done a tremendous job at it. Hence the litany of options to ensure correct order and execution: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/syst...
And outside of esoteric setups I haven't ever encountered the problems you mentioned with service files.
runit's approach is to just keep trying to start the shell script every 2 seconds until it works. One of those worse–is–better ideas, it's really dumb, and effective. You can check for arbitrary conditions and error–exit, and it will keep trying. If you need the time synced you can just make your script fail if the time is not synced.
traditional inittab is older than that and there's not any reason to use it when you could be using runit, really.
like "at least one real IP address is available" or "time has been synced"
and it's not esoteric, even ListenAddress with sshd doesn't even work reliably
the ONLY piece of systemd I've not had problems with is systemd-boot, and then it turned out they didn't write that
"network-online.target is a target that actively waits until the network is “up”, where the definition of “up” is defined by the network management software. Usually it indicates a configured, routable IP address of some kind. Its primary purpose is to actively delay activation of services until the network has been set up."
For time sync checks, I assume one of the targets available will effectively mean a time sync has happened. Or you can do something with ExecStartPre. You could run a shell command that checks for the most recent time sync or forces one.
this service (untouched by me) had:
After=local-fs.target network-online.target remote-fs.target time-sync.target
but it was still started without an IP address, and then failed to bind
just like this sort of problem: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4880#issuecomment-...
the entire thing is unreliable and doesn't act like you'd expect
> Or you can do something with ExecStartPre. You could run a shell command that checks for the most recent time sync or forces one.
at that point I might as well go back to init=/etc/rc
You could also try targeting NetworkManager or networkd's "wait-online" services. Or if that doesn't work, something is telling systemd that you have an IP when you don't. NetworkManager has "ipv4.may-fail" and "ipv6.may-fail" that might be errenously true.
> at that point I might as well go back to init=/etc/rc
The difference is that systemd is much better at ensuring correctness. If you write the invoked shell command properly, it'll communicate failure or success correct and systemd will then communicate that state to the unit. It's still a lot more robust than before.
So basically it just doesn't work sometimes for no particular reason.
> The difference is that systemd is much better at ensuring correctness
Uh, well, you just said that it isn't, because some targets like network-online.target don't work from user unit files.
the problem is systemd
> The difference is that systemd is much better at ensuring correctness.
yeah, whatever mate
There is so much granularity and flexibility in what you can do it seems rather unlikely you cannot make it happen correctly. And if it is truly a bug... open an issue? They're rather responsive to it. And it isn't like the legacy init systems were bug free from inception (well, lord knows they were still chock full of bugs even when they were replaced).
Edit: sitting here with a grin .. HN downvoting the advice of checking logs, debugging and opening an issue. I wish the companies y'all work at good luck.. they'll need it.
I'm a pragmatist: I just want it to work
my solution to MULTIPLE different services failing to IP bind is to turn on the non-local ip binding sysctl, bypassing systemd's brokenness entirely
> There is so much granularity and flexibility in what you can do it seems rather unlikely you cannot make it happen correctly.
I've written an init before (in C), I know how the netlink interface to set an IP address and add routing table entries works
I understand the difference between monotonic and wall clocks
I understand the difference between Wants and Require
I know what's going on at every, single, level
and I can't stand how unreliable systemd makes nearly every single one of my, bluntly, completely vanilla systems
> And if it is truly a bug... open an issue?
did you read the link I pasted earlier?
I'm not wasting my time with that level of idiocy (from LP himself)
I'm not a systemd hater or anything, but I continue to read stuff from Poettering which to me is deeply disturbing given the programs he works on.
Saying it's not a bug that service is launched despite a stated required prerequisite dependency failed... WTF?
Sure, I agree with him that most computers should probably boot despite NTP being unable to sync. But proposing that the solution to that is breaking Requires is just wild to me.
The question in that issue is around the semantics of time-sync.target. Targets are synchronization points for the system and don't (afaik) generally make promises about the units that are ordered before them (in this case chrony-wait.service.
Does that answer your specific objection of "proposing that the solution to that is breaking Requires is just wild to me"? Basically, what is proposed in that issue is not breaking Requires=. The proposition is that the user add their own, specific Requires= as a drop-in configuration since that's not a generally-applicable default.
Targets[1]: Target units do not offer any additional functionality on top of the generic functionality provided by units. They merely group units, allowing a single target name to be used in Wants= and Requires= settings to establish a dependency on a set of units defined by the target, and in Before= and After= settings to establish ordering.
boot-complete.target[2]: Order units that shall only run when the boot process is considered successful after the target unit and pull in the target from it, also with Requires=.
Note use of "only run" with a reference to Requires=.
time-sync.target[3]: This target provides stricter clock accuracy guarantees than time-set.target (see above), but likely requires network communication and thus introduces unpredictable delays. Services that require clock accuracy and where network communication delays are acceptable should use this target.
Especially note the last sentence there.
The documentation clearly indicates that targets can fail, and that services that needs the target to be successful, should use Requires= to specify that.
If the above is not true, the Requires= and Targets documentation should be rewritten to explicitly say that targets might fulfill Requires= regardless of state. Also, the documentation for time-sync.target should explicitly remove the last sentence and instead state there is no functional difference between Requires=time-sync.target and Wants=time-sync.target, it is best-effort only.
[1]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/syst...
[2]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/syst...
[3]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/syst...
If he really don't want targets to deliver failed/success guarantees, then they've massively miscommunicated in their documentation. That in my book is a huge deal.
In either case the issue should in no circumstance be casually dismissed as not-a-bug without further action.
I'm sure the project would accept a documentation patch to amend this discrepancy. At the end of the day (despite what some people on the internet might like to allege), systemd is a free software project that, despite having (more or less) a BIFL, is ultimately a relatively bazaar-like project.
Though since these targets and unit properties are very core to systemd-the-service manager, I do think that this is a bigger documentation oversight than most.
To me this is a huge red flag for a senior contributer to a core systems component, signalling some fundamental lack of understanding or imagination.
I very much disagree with not fixing time-sync.target, but if he had instead written a well-reasoned explanation for why time-sync.target should not propagate failed states and flagging it as a documentation bug, then that's something I'd respect and would be fine with. Or, even better IMHO, he'd fix time-sync.target and state that users who wants to boot regardless should use Wants instead.
It is possible for a specification to be so abstract that it's useless.
well, systemd's got them beat there!
… and the warrant canary we publish every Monday morning.
Doubtful the motivation was /etc/rc being too slow
daemontools, runit, s6 solve that problem
IIRC before PulseAudio we had to mess around with ALSA directly (memory hazy, it was a while ago). It could be a bit of a pain.
ALSA was kind of OK after mixing was enabled by default and if you didn't need to switch outputs of a running application between anything but internal speakers and headphones (which worked basically in hardware). With any additional devices that you could add and remove, ALSA became a more serious limitation, depending. You could usually choose your audio devices (including microphones) at least at the beginning of a video conference / playing a movie etc, but it was janky (unreliable, list of 20 devices for one multi-channel sound card) and needed explicit support from all applications. Not sure if it ever worked with Bluetooth.
It does, with the help of BlueALSA[0].
I get ALSA followed the Unix philosophy of doing one thing but I want my audio mixer to play multiple sounds at once.
I didn't actually know anything about Linux at the time and started with Gentoo because I saw a meme saying "install Gentoo" and people told me not to start with that distro. So it's possible I messed up the default config by accident.
Either way PulseAudio worked after I emerged it.
I am not seeing these kind of systemd issues with Fedora / RHEL.
It just works
I believe that you are genuinely being sincere here, thinking this is good advice.
But this is an absolutely terrible philosophy. This statement is ignorant as well as inconsiderate. (again, I do believbe you don't intend to be inconsiderate consciously, that is just the result.)
It's ignorant of history and inconsiderate of everyone else but yourself.
Go back a few years and this same logic says "The trick is, just use Windows and do whatever it wants and don't fight."
So why in the world are you even using Linux at all in the first place with that attitude? For dishonest reasons (when unpacked to show the double standard).
Since you are using Linux instead of Windows, then you actually are fine with fighting the tide. You want the particular bits of control you want, and as long as you are lucky enough to get whatever you happen to care about without fighting too much, then you have no sympathy for anyone else who cares aboiut anything else.
You don't see yourself as fighting any tides because you are benefitting from being able to use a mainstream distro without customizing it. But the only reason you get to enjoy any such thing at all in the first place is because a lot of other people before you fought the tide to bring some mainstream distros into existence, and actually use them for ordinary activities enough despite all the difficulties, to force at least some companies and government agencies to acknowledge them. So now you can say things like "just use a mainstream distro as it comes and don't try to do what you actually want".
This is basically exactly what I saw people saying in Windows subreddits. There's one post that particularly sticks out in my memory[0] that basically had everybody telling the OP to just not make any of the changes that they wanted to make. The advice seemed to revolve around adapting to the OS rather than adapting the OS to you, and it made me sad at the time.
[0] https://www.reddit.com/r/Windows10/comments/hehrqe/what_are_...
Incorrect. I used mainstream distro, still had issues, that just solved itself moving to pipewire. Issues like it literally crashing or emitting spur of max volume noise once every few months for no discernable reason.
Pulseaudio also completely denies existence of people trying to do music on Linux, there is no real way to make latency on it be good.
> SystemD is very opinionated, so you'd assume it wouldn't have the same results, but it does.. if you use a popular distro then they've done a lot of the hard work that makes systemd function smooth.
Over the years of using the "opinion" of SystemD seems to be "if it is not problem on Lennart's laptop, it's not a real problem and it can be closed or ignored completely".
For example systemd have no real method to tell it "turn off all apps after 5 minutes regardless of what silly package maintainers think". Now what happens if you have a server on UPS that have say 5 minutes of battery and one of the apps have some problem and doesn't want to close?
In SysV, it gets killed, and system gets remounted read only. You have app crash recovery but at least your filesystem is clean In systemd ? No option to do that. You can set default timeout but it can be override in each service so you'd have to audit every single package and tune it to achieve that. That was one bug that was closed.
Same problem also surfaced if you have say app with a bug that prevented it from closing from sigterm and you wanted to reboot a machine. Completely stuck
But wait, there is another method, systemd have an override, you can press (IIRC) ctrl+alt+delete 7 times within 2 seconds to force it to restart ( which already confuses some people that expect it to just restart machine clean(ish) regardless https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11285 ).
...which is also impossible if your only method of access is software KVM where you need to navigate to menu to send ctrl+alt+del. So I made ticket with proposal to just make it configurable timeout for the CAD ( https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/29616 ), the ticket wasn't even read completely because Mr. Poettering said "this is not actionable, give a proposal", so I pasted the thing he decided to ignore in original ticket, and got ignored. Not even "pull requests welcome" (which I'd be fine with, I just wanted confirmation that the feature like that won't be rejected if I start writing it).
There is also issue of journald disk format being utter piece of garbage ("go thru entire journal just to get app's last few lines bad", hundreds of disk reads on simple systemctl status <appname> bad) that is consistently ignored thru many tickets from different people.
Or the issue that resolvconf replacement in systemd will just roll a dice on DNS ordering, but hey, Mr. Lennart doesn't use openvpn so it's not real issue ( https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/27543 )
I'm not writing it to shit on systemd and praise what was before, as a piece of software it's very useful for my job as sysadmin (we literally took tens of thousands lines of fixed init scripts out because all of the features could be achieved in unit files) and I mean "saved tons of time and few demons running" in some cases, but Mr. Poettering is showing same ignorant "I know better" attitude he got scolded at by kernel maintainers.
I don't care much about PA at this point tbh and don't know much about the inner workings; it always worked just fine for me. But from what I read from people more "in the know" at the time, I'd heard that a lot of the (very real) user-facing problems with PA were ultimately caused by driver and other low-level problems. Those were hacky, had poor assumptions, etc. PA ultimately exposed those failures, and largely got better over time because those problems got fixed upstream of PA.
My takeaway from what I read was basically that PA had to stumble and walk so that pipewire could run.
> For example systemd have no real method to tell it "turn off all apps after 5 minutes regardless of what silly package maintainers think". Now what happens if you have a server on UPS that have say 5 minutes of battery and one of the apps have some problem and doesn't want to close?
Add a TimeoutStopSec= to /etc/systemd/system/service.d/my-killing-dropin.conf more or less, I think? These are documented in the systemd.service and systemd.unit manpages respectively.
> Same problem also surfaced if you have say app with a bug that prevented it from closing from sigterm and you wanted to reboot a machine. Completely stuck
See the --force option on the halt, poweroff, and reboot subcommands of systemctl. The kill subcommand if you want to target that specific service.
> so I pasted the thing he decided to ignore in original ticket, and got ignored. Not even "pull requests welcome" (which I'd be fine with, I just wanted confirmation that the feature like that won't be rejected if I start writing it).
I'm certainly sympathetic to this pain point. I'd take Lennart at his word that he's not opposed. Generally speaking, from following the systemd project somewhat, it's a very busy project and it's hard for all issues to get serviced. But they're very open to PRs, generally speaking.
> Or the issue that resolvconf replacement in systemd will just roll a dice on DNS ordering, but hey, Mr. Lennart doesn't use openvpn so it's not real issue ( https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/27543 )
Quickly taking a peek here (and speaking as a relatively superficial user of resolved myself), isn't the proposed solution to define interface ordering?
> it will ask on all links in parallel if there's no better routing info available. In your case there is none (i.e. no ~. listed among your network interfaces), hence it will be asked on all interfaces at the same time.
"In fact, the way I see things the Linux API has been taking the role of the POSIX API and Linux is the focal point of all Free Software development. Due to that I can only recommend developers to try to hack with only Linux in mind and experience the freedom and the opportunities this offers you. So, get yourself a copy of The Linux Programming Interface, ignore everything it says about POSIX compatibility and hack away your amazing Linux software. It's quite relieving!" -- https://archive.fosdem.org/2011/interview/lennart-poettering...
Audio server for linux: Great idea! Pulseaudio: Genuinely a terrible implementation of it, Pipewire is a drop in replacement that actually works.
Launchd but for Linux: Great idea! SystemD: generally works now at least, but packed with insane defaults and every time this is brought up with the devs they say its the distro packagers jobs to wipe SystemD's ass and clean up the mess before users see it.
Security bug in SystemD when the user has a digit in their username: Lennart closes the bug and says that SystemD is perfect, the distros erred by permitting such usernames. Insane ego-driven response.
I am not going to struggle with systemd if I have to build containers specifically for it. If I have to rearrange everything I am doing I would just learn to do it on a minimal Kubernetes install instead.
I don't think the setting is exposed to regular service units (it might be able to in the future, I don't know) and I don't think podman has any integration with it.
What kinda service do you have where you need a full range of UIDs?
Let's say Home Assistant. It would be nice to have a have some system user "homeassistant" with no home directory that owns the process and owns its /var/whereever/config.conf . It would be nice to have the isolation on host in addition to the isolation via container. But I don't want to be rebuilding any containers to get that, unless I am misunderstanding something on nsresourced.
I'd be really pleased with that setup. MQTT could be its own system user. And HA could depend on MQTT so I have nice startup behavior. Etc.
IDK how to have system users like this run a container without the subuid range. Even when I create the users with ranges in the file, there seems to be problems with informing systemd (as a non-root user) that the running process is different from the one it started.
> But I don't want to be rebuilding any containers to get that, unless I am misunderstanding something on nsresourced.
Setting up the user namespace would be part of the container manager and not the containers themselves, so they shouldn't need any rebuilding or special handling (possibly the files might need to be shifted into the "foreign ID" range[1, 2], but I might be lying with this and this isn't necessary for this usecase) but the container manager needs to be specifically make use of nsresourced.
I really think currently the best option is to go with either systemd as your "container manager" (e.g. just regular system files with sandboxing or nspawn images or maybe systemd-portabled[3]) or podman as your container manager. As much as I too would love to mix them, I don't think it's the best idea (at least in the current state) and just go with what is more suited for the task (in your case it sounds like podman would be the most suited option).
> there seems to be problems with informing systemd (as a non-root user) that the running process is different from the one it started.
Yea, I don't think systemd likes double forking. The best option would be to keep the process that spawned your actual process alive until the child exists and just bubble up the exit code. There is the `PIDFile=` option with `Type=forking`, but I haven't used it, nor looked much into it.
[0]: https://docs.podman.io/en/v5.7.1/markdown/podman-systemd.uni...
[1]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/syst...
[2]: https://systemd.io/UIDS-GIDS/#special-systemd-uid-ranges
What, this part is only needed for secure boot? I'm not sec... oh. So go back to the UEFI settings, turn secure boot off, problem solved. I usually also turn off SELinux right after install.
So I'm an old greybeard who likes to have full control. Less secure. But at least I get the choice. Hopefully I continue to do so. The notion of not being able to access online banking services or other things that require account login, without running on a "fully attested" system does worry me.
Currently SB is effectively useless because it will at best authenticate your kernel but the initrd and subsequent userspace (including programs that run as root) are unverified and can be replaced by malicious alternatives.
Secure Boot as it stands right now in the Linux world is effectively an annoyance that’s only there as a shortcut to get distros to boot on systems that trust Microsoft’s keys but otherwise offer no actual security.
It however doesn’t have to be this way, and I welcome efforts to make Linux just as secure as proprietary OSes who actually have full code signature verification all the way down to userspace.
sign grub with your own keys (some motherboards let you to do so). don't let random things signed by microsoft to boot (it defeats the whole point)
so you have grub in an efi partition, it passes secure boot, loads, and attempts to unlock a luks partition with the user provided passphrase. if it passed secure boot it should increase confidence that you are typing you password into the legit thing
so anyway, after unlocking luks, it locates the kernel and initrd inside it, and boots
https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/GRUB#Encrypted_/boot
the reason I don't do it is.. my laptop is buggy. often when I enable secure boot, something periodically gets corrupted (often when the laptop powers off due to low power) and when it gets up, it doesn't verify anything. slightly insane tech
however, this is still better than, at failure, letting anything run
sophisticated attackers will defeat this, but they can also add a variety of attacks at hardware level
Chaining trust from POST to login feels like trying to make a theoretically perfect diamond and titanium bicycle that never wears down or falls apart when all I need is an automated system to tell me when to replace a part that’s about to fail.
You can have both full disk encryption AND a tamper protection!
(1) Encryption: fast and fantastic, and a must-have for at-rest data protection.
It is vulnerable to password theft though. An attacker might insert evil code between power-on and disk-password-entry. With a locked down BIOS / UEFI, the only way to insert the code is to take the boot drive out of the device, modify it, put it back, and hope no one notices. “Noticing” in this case is done by either:
(2) Trust chaining: verify the signatures of the entire boot process to detect evil code.
(3) Tamper detection: verify the physical integrity of the device.
My point is that (1) is a given, and out of (2) or (3), I’d rather have the latter than deal with the shoddiness of the former
Reminds me of my old Chromebook Pixel I wiped chromeos from. Every time it booted I had to press Ctrl-L (iirc) to continue the boot, any other keypress would reenable secure boot and the only way I knew to recover from that was to reinstall chromeos, which would wipe my linux partition and my files with it. Needless to say, that computer taught me good backup discipline...
I think you might want to go re-read the last ~6 months of IT news in regards of "secure proprietary OSes".
There's always going to be a market for computers that can run unapproved software. I don't see that going away.
But you miss a critical part - Secure Boot, as the name implies is for boot, not OS runtime. Linux I suppose considers the part after initrd load, post-boot perhaps?
I think pid-1 hash verification from the kernel is not a huge ask, as part of secure boot, and leave it to the init system to implement or not implement user-space executable/script signature enforcement. I'm sure Mr. Poettering wouldn't mind.
add luks root, then it's not that bad
Then there is also `ukify` by systemd which also can create UKIs, which then can be installed with `kernel-install`, but that is a bit more work to set up than for `mkinitcpio`.
The main part is the signing, which I usually have `sbctl` handle.
Yes that's the case - my argument is that Linux currently doesn't have anything standardized to do that.
Your best bet for now is to use a read-only dm-verity-protected volume as the root partition, encode its hash in the initrd, combine kernel + initrd into a UKI and sign that.
I would welcome a standardized approach.
ParticleOS[0] gives a look at how this can all fit together, in case you want to see some of it in action.
Code signature verification is an interesting idea, but I'm not sure how it could be achieved. Have distro maintainers sign the code?
Have a look at Ubuntu Core 24 and later. Though it's not exactly a desktop system, but rathe oriented towards embedded/appliances. Recent Ubuntu desktop (from 25.04 IIRC) started getting the same mechanism gradually integrated in each release. Upcoming Ubuntu 26.04 is expected to support TPM backed FDE. Worth a try if you can set up a VM with a software TPM.
Keep in mind though, there's been plenty of issues with various EFI firmwares, especially on the appliances side. EFI specs are apparently treated as guidelines rather than actual specification by whoever ends up implementing the firmware.
Most of the firmwares I've used lately seem to allow adding custom secureboot keys.
You don't need to load a driver; you can just replace a binary that's going to be executed as root as part of system boot. This is something a hypothetical code signature verification would detect and prevent.
Failing kernel-level code signature enforcement, the next best step is to have a dm-verity volume as your root partition, with the dm-verity hashes in the initrd within the UKI, and that UKI being signed with secure boot.
This would theoretically allow you to recover from even root-level compromise by just rebooting the machine (assuming the secure boot signing keys weren't on said machine itself).
* smartphone device integrity checks (SafetyNet / Play Integrity / Apple DeviceCheck)
* HDMI/HDCP
* streaming DRM (Widevine / FairPlay)
* Secure Boot (vendor-keyed deployments)
* printers w/ signed/chipped cartridges (consumables auth)
* proprietary file formats + network effects (office docs, messaging)
However, I agree that the risks to individuals and their freedoms stemming from these technologies outweigh the benefits in most cases.
This is not what attestation is even seeking to solve.
Why do people take DA as "Hail Satan" anyways.
For another example, IntegriCloud: https://secure.integricloud.com/
I personally don't think this product matters all that much for now. These types of tech is not oppressive by itself, only when it is being demanded by an adversary. The ability of the adversary to demand it is a function of how widespread the capability is, and there aren't going to be enough Linux clients for this to start infringing on the rights of the general public just yet.
A bigger concern is all the efforts aimed at imposing integrity checks on platforms like the Web. That will eventually force users to make a choice between being denied essential services and accepting these demands.
I also think AI would substantially curtail the effect of many of these anti-user efforts. For example a bot can be programmed to automate using a secure phone and controlled from a user-controlled device, cheat in games, etc.
Great example of proving something to your own organization. Mullvad is probably the most trusted VPN provider and they do this! But this is not a power that should be exposed to regular applications, or we end up with a dystopian future of you are not allowed to use your own computer.
I wish this myth would die at this point.
Secure Boot allows you to enroll your own keys. This is part of the spec, and there are no shipped firmwares that prevents you from going through this process.
The banking apps still won't trust them, though.
To add a quote from Lennart himself:
"The OS configuration and state (i.e. /etc/ and /var/) must be encrypted, and authenticated before they are used. The encryption key should be bound to the TPM device; i.e system data should be locked to a security concept belonging to the system, not the user."
Your system will not belong to you anymore. Just as it is with Android.
The oppressive part of this scheme is that Google's integrity check only passes for _their_ keys, which form a chain of trust through the TEE/TPM, through the bootloader and finally through the system image. Crucially, the only part banks should care about should just be the TEE and some secure storage, but Google provides an easy attestation scheme only for the entire hardware/software environment and not just the secure hardware bit that already lives in your phone and can't be phished.
It would be freaking cool if someone could turn your TPM into a Yubikey and have it be useful for you and your bank without having to verify the entire system firmware, bootloader and operating system.
Microsoft required that users be able to enroll their own keys on x86. On ARM, they used to mandate that users could not enroll their own keys. That they later changed this does not erase the past. Also, I've anecdotally heard claims of buggy implementations that do in fact prevent users from changing secure boot settings.
(This is separate from Windows RT, of course)
I exchanged it for an Asrock board and there I can enable secure boot without MS keys and still have it boot cuz they actually let you choose what level of signing the opt-rom needs when you enable secure boot.
What I want to say with this is that it requires the company to actually care to provide a good experience.
UEFI secure boot on PCs, yes for the most part. A lot of mobile platforms just never supported this. It's not a myth.
Note that the comment you replied to does not even mention phones. Locked down Secure Boot on UEFI is not uncommon on mobile platforms, such as x86-64 tablets.
Many motherboards secure boot implimentation violates the supposed standard and does not allow you to invalidate the pre-loaded keys you don't approve of.
Attestation, the thing we're going to be spending the next forever trying to get out of phones, now in your kernel.
The Free Software movement was successful enough that by 1997 it was garnering a lot of international community support and manpower. Eric S. Raymond published CatB in response to these successes, partly with a goal of "celebrating its successes" — sendmail, gcc, perl, and Linux were all popular projects with a huge number of collaborators by this point — and partly with a goal of reframing the Free Software movement such that it effectively neuters the political basis (i.e. the four freedoms, etc.) in a company-friendly way. It's very easy to note when reading the book, how it consistently celebrates the successes of Free Software in a company friendly way, deliberately to make it appealing to companies. Often being very explicit about its goals, e.g. "Don't give your workers good bonuses, because research shows that the better a ''hacker'' the less they care about money!".
A year later, internal memos from Microsoft leaked that showed that management were indeed scared shitless about Linux, a movement that they could neither completely Embrace, Extend, and Extinguish, nor practice Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt on, because the community that built it were too strong, and too dedicated. Management foresaw that it was only a matter until Linux was a very strong competitor — even if that's taken 20 years, they were decently accurate in their fears, and, to be honest, part of why it's taken 30 years for Linux to catch up are deliberate actions by Microsoft wrt. introducing and adopting technologies that would stymie the Free Software movement from being able to adapt.
this basically will remove or significantly encumber user control over their system, such that any modification will make you loose your "signed" status and ... boom! goodbye accessing the internet without an id
pottering recently works for Microsoft, they want to turn linux into an appliance just like windows, no longer a general purpose os. the transition is still far from over on windows, but look at android and how the google play services dependency/choke-hold is
im sure ill get many down votes, but despite some hyperbole this is the trajectory
I do agree that these technologies can be abused. But system integrity is also a prerequisite for security; it's not like this is like Digital "Rights" Management, where it's unequivocally a bad thing that only advances evil interests. Like, Widevine should never have been made a thing in Firefox imo.
So I think what's most productive here is to build immutable, signable systems that can preserve user freedom, and then use social and political means to further guarantee those freedoms. For instance a requirement that owning a device means being able to provision your own keys. Bans on certain attestation schemes. Etc. (I empathize with anyone who would be cynical about those particular possibilities though.)
[0] https://0pointer.net/blog/fitting-everything-together.html
The plan is probably to have that as an alternative for the niche uses where that is appropriate.
This majority of this thread seems to have slid on that slippery slope, and jumped directly to the conclusion where the attestation mechanism will be mandatory on all linux machines in the world and you won't be able to run anything without. Which even if it would be a purpose for amutable as a company, it's unfeasible to do when there's such a breadth of distributions and non corpo affiliated developers out there that would need to cooperate for that to happen.
Eventually you will not be able to block ads.
Maybe you want to reread through this thread.
> Eventually you will not be able to block ads.
That's so far down the slippery slope and with so many other things that need to go wrong that I'm not worried and I'm willing to be the one to get "told you so" if it happens.
But then Linux wouldn't be where it is without the business side paying for the developers. There is no such thing as a free lunch...
Yeah. I'm pretty sure it requires a very specific psychological profile to decide to work on such a user-hostile project while post-fact rationalizing that it's "for good".
All I can say is I'm not surprised that Poettering is involved in such a user-hostile attack on free computing.
P.S: I don't care about the downvotes, you shouldn't either.
P.S: Upvoted you. I don't care about downvotes either.
In the great scheme of things, this period where systemd was intentionally designed and developed and funded to hurt your autonomy but seemed temporarily innocuous will be a rounding error.
It sounds like you want to achieve system transparency, but I don't see any clear mention of reproducible builds or transparency logs anywhere.
I have followed systemd's efforts into Secure Boot and TPM use with great interest. It has become increasingly clear that you are heading in a very similar direction to these projects:
- Hal Finney's transparent server
- Keylime
- System Transparency
- Project Oak
- Apple Private Cloud Compute
- Moxie's Confer.to
I still remember Jason introducing me to Lennart at FOSDEM in 2020, and we had a short conversation about System Transparency.
I'd love to meet up at FOSDEM. Email me at fredrik@mullvad.net.
Edit: Here we are six years later, and I'm pretty sure we'll eventually replace a lot of things we built with things that the systemd community has now built. On a related note, I think you should consider using Sigsum as your transparency log. :)
Edit2: For anyone interested, here's a recent lightning talk I did that explains the concept that all project above are striving towards, and likely Amutable as well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lo0gxBWwwQE
Our entire team will be at FOSDEM, and we'd be thrilled to meet more of the Mullvad team. Protecting systems like yours is core to us. We want to understand how we put the right roots of trust and observability into your hands.
Edit: I've reached out privately by email for next steps, as you requested.
As I mentioned above, we've followed systemd's development in recent years with great interest, as well as that of some other projects. When I started(*) the System Transparency project it was very much a research project.
Today, almost seven years later, I think there's a great opportunity for us to reduce our maintenance burden by re-architecting on top of systemd, and some other things. That way we can focus on other things. There's still a lot of work to do on standardizing transparency building blocks, the witness ecosystem(**), and building an authentication mechanism for system transparency that weaves it all together.
I'm more than happy to share my notes with you. Best case you build exactly what we want. Then we don't have to do it. :)
I have this fond memory of that Notary in Germany who did a remote attestation of me being with him in the same room, voting on a shareholder resolution.
While I was currently traveling on the other side of the planet.
This great concept that totally will not blow up the planet has been proudly brought to you by Ze Germans.
No matter what your intentions are: It WILL be abused and it WILL blow up. Stop this and do something useful.
[While systemd had been a nightmare for years, these days its actually pretty good, especially if you disable the "oh, and it can ALSO create perfect eggs benedict and make you a virgin again while booting up the system!" part of it. So, no bad feelings here. Also, I am German. Also: Insert list of history books here.]
The website itself is rather vague in its stated goals and mechanisms.
A concrete example of that is electronic ballots, which is a topic I often bump heads with the rest of HN about, where a hardware identity token (an electronic ID provided by the state) can be used to participate in official ballots, while both the citizen and the state can have some assurance that there was nothing interceding between them in a malicious way.
Does that make sense?
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45743756
https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/09/intel-and-amd-trust...
You'll be free to run your own Linux, but don't expect it to work outside of niche uses.
They'd need to get MS to sign it first, but otherwise yea. That's why I remove the MS keys on my non-windows systems.
Your step of removing the MS keys works of course :) Although I've heard that can be risky on various systems that need to load MS-signed EEPROMS. Also I think that firmware updates can be problematic?
Yea, I bricked a Gigabyte board and still haven't been able to fix it. I just replaced it with an Asrock board and that has settings for what to do with option-rom when secureboot is enabled (always execute, always deny, allow execute, defer execute, deny execute and query user) and I have no clue what half of them specifically do (like, does "allow execute" only execute if a matching key exists and doesn't execute if it doesn't? and what is the difference between "always deny" and "deny execute"? and defer to when??). But I just set it to always execute and my problem is solved.
One good news is that maybe LP will get less involved in systemd.
See Android; or, where you no longer own your device, and if the company decides, you no longer own your data or access to it.
Yes, system data should be locked to the system with a TPM. That way your system can refuse to boot if it's been modified to steal your user secrets.
Preventing this was the reason we had free software in the first place.
Jesus.
Remote attestation requires a great deal of trust, and I simply don't have it when it comes to this leadership team.
Probably obvious from the surnames but this is the first time I've seen a EU company pop up on Hacker News that could be mistaken for a Californian company. Nice to see that ambition.
I understand systemd is controversial, that can be debated endlessly but the executive team and engineering team look very competitive. Will be interesting to see where this goes.
I am glad to see these efforts are now under an independent firm rather than being directed by Microsoft.
What is the ownership structure like? Where/who have you received funding from, and what is the plan for ongoing monetization of your work?
Would you ever sell the company to Microsoft, Google, or Amazon?
Thanks.
No matter what the founders say, the answer to this question is always yes.
I don't think you will ever get a response to that
I'm not asking for a client list, to be clear.
https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/speaker/lennart_poettering/
What does this mean? Why would anyone want this? Can you explain this to me like I'm five years old?
That does not follow. That would only very specifically happen when all of these are true:
1. Secure Boot cannot be disabled
2. You cannot provision your own Secure Boot keys
3. Your desired operating system is not signed by the computer's trusted Secure Boot keys
"Starting in a verified state and stay[ing] trusted over time" sounds more like using measured boot. Which is basically its own thing and most certainly does not preclude booting whatever OS you choose.
Although if your comment was meant in a cynical way rather than approaching things technically, than I don't think my reply helps much.
systemd kept him away from pulseaudio and whoever is/was maintaining that after him was doing a good job of fixing it.
See: “it’s just an init system”where it’s now also a resolver, log system, etc.
I can buy good intentions, but this opens up too much possibility for not-so-good-intended consequences. Deliberate or emergent.
it's a buggy-as-hell resolver, buggy-as-hell log system, buggy-as-hell ntp client, buggy-as-hell network manager, ...
Atomicity means you can track every change, and every change is so small that it affects only one thing and can be traced, replayed or rolled back. Like it's going from A to B and being able to return back to A (or going to B again) in a determinate manner.
For individuals, IMO the risk mostly come from software they want to run (install script or supply chain attack). So if the end user is in control of what gets signed, I don't see much benefit. Unless you force users to use an app store...
Whatever it is, I hope it doesn't go the usual path of a minimal support, optional support and then being virtually mandatory by means of tight coupling with other subsystems.
Can you imaging the creator of systemd not to?
So we try to make every new feature that might be disruptive optional in systemd and opt-in. Of course we don't always succeed and there will always be differences in opinion.
Also, we're a team of people that started in open source and have done open source for most of our careers. We definitely don't intend to change that at all. Keeping systemd a healthy project will certainly always stay important for me.
Thanks for the answer. Let me ask you something close with a more blunt angle:
Considering most of the tech is already present and shipping in the current systemd, what prevents our systems to become a immutable monolith like macOS or current Android with the flick of a switch?
Or a more grave scenario: What prevents Microsoft from mandating removal of enrollment permissions for user keychains and Secure Boot toggle, hence every Linux distribution has to go through Microsoft's blessing to be bootable?
But we will never enforce using any of these features in systemd itself. It will always be up to the distro to enable and configure the system to become an immutable monolith. And I certainly don't think distributions like Fedora or Debian will ever go in that direction.
We don't really have any control over what Microsoft decides to do with Secure Boot. If they decide at one point to make Secure Boot reject any Linux distribution and hardware vendors prevent enrolling user owned keys, we're in just as much trouble as everyone else running Linux will be.
I doubt that will actually happen in practice though.
So, plausible deniability. It's not the systemd project, it's the distro.
> I certainly don't think distributions like Fedora or Debian will ever go in that direction.
In the past they made decisions that we can call unexpected. I believe that in the short term future they won't but in say ten years? I'm not sure. The technology (created by Amutable?) will be mature by that time and ready to close Linux down.
Then maybe you shouldn't be doing it?
But I'm losing hope with those.
Why are you buying hardware that Microsoft controls if you're concerned about this?
Theoretically, nothing. But it's worth pointing out that so far they have actually done the opposite. They currently mandate that hardware vendors must allow you to enroll your own keys. There was a somewhat questionable move recently where they introduced a 'more secure by default' branding in which the 3rd party CA (used e.g. go sign shim for Linux) is disabled by default, but again, they mandated there must be an easy toggle to enable it. I don't begrudge them to much for it, because there have been multiple instances of SB bypass via 3rd party signed binaries.
All of this is to say: this is not a scenario I'm worried about today. Of course this may change down the line.
Given Microsoft's track record I don't believe this will stay that way for long.
Plus, it's an avoidant and reductionist take.
Note: I have nothing against BSDs, but again, this is not the answer.
Stop trying to make everyone act like you act.
Also, I know. A few of my colleagues run {open, free, dragonfly}BSD as their daily drivers for more than two decades. Also, we have BSD based systems at a couple of places.
However, as a user of almost all mainstream OSes (at the same time, for different reasons), and planning to include OpenBSD to that roster (taking care of a fleet takes time), I'd love to everyone select the correct tool for their applications and don't throw stones at people who doesn't act like them.
Please remember that we all sit in houses made of glass before throwing things to others.
Oh, also please don't make assumptions about people you don't know.
Yeah! Telling people what to do is rude!
> Anyone still using Linux on the desktop in 2026 should switch
Oh.
"Just don't use X" is in fact a very engaged and principled response. Try again.
If you were not a systemd maintainer and have started this project/company independently targeting systemd, you would have to go through the same process as everyone and I would have expected the systemd maintainers to, look at it objectively and review with healthy skepticism before accepting it. But we cannot rely on that basic checks and balances anymore and that's the most worrying part.
> that might be disruptive optional in systemd
> we don't always succeed and there will always be differences in opinion.
You (including other maintainers) are still the final arbitrator of what's disruptive. The differences of opinion in the past have mostly been settled as "deal with it" and that's the basis of current skepticism.
That's the keyword.
Companies. Not people.
I find it hard to believe. Like, at all. Especially given that the general posture of your project leader is the exact opposite of that.
> systemd a healthy project
I can see that we share the same view that there are indeed differences in opinion.
What problem does this solve for Linux or people who use Linux? Why is this different from me simply enabling encryption on the drive?
In my case I am talking about myself. I prefer to actually know what is running on my systems and ensure that they are as I expect them to be and not that they may have been modified unbeknownst to me.
It's the people behind this project who scare me.
2. Are you looking for pilot customers?
Are these some problems you've personally been dealing with?
Then we discovered snapshot.debian.org wasn't feeling well, so that was another (important) detour.
Part of me wish we had focused more on getting System Transparency in its entirety in production at Mullvad. On the other hand I certainly don't regret us creating Tillitis TKey, Sigsum, taking care of Debian Snapshot service, and several other things.
Now, six years later, systemd and other projects have gotten a long way to building several of the things we need for ST. It doesn't make sense to do double work, so I want to seize the moment and make sure we coordinate.
As per the announcement, we’ll be building a favorite color over the next months and sharing more information as it rolls out.
- it looks like they want to build a ChromeOS without Google.
Device attestation fails? No streaming video or audio for you (you obvious pirate!).
Device attestation fails? No online gaming for you (you obvious cheater!).
Device attestation fails? No banking for you (you obvious fraudster!).
Device attestation fails? No internet access for you (you obvious dissident!).
Sure, there are some good uses of this, and those good uses will happen, but this sort of tech will be overwhelmingly used for bad.
Who is this for / what problem does it solve?
I guess security? Or maybe reproducability?
I can relate to people being rather hostile to the idea of boot verification, because this is a process that is really low level and also something that we as computer experts rarely interact with more deeply. The most challenging part of installing a Linux system is always installing the boot loader, potentially setting up an UEFI partition. These are things that I don't do everyday and that I don't have deep knowledge in. And if things go wrong, then it is extra hard to fix things. Secure boot makes it even harder to understand what is going on. There is a general lack of knowledge of what is happening behind the scenes and it is really hard to learn about it. I feel that the people behind this project should really keep XKCD 2501 in mind when talking to their fellow computer experts.
Yeah it could be. Could. But it also could be used for limiting freedoms with general purpose computing. Guess what is it going to be?
> hostile to the idea of boot verification, because this is a process that is really low level
Not because of that.
Because it's only me who gets to decide what runs on my computer, not someone else. I don't need LP's permission to run binaries.
I mean, in theory, the idea is great. But it WILL be misused by greedy fucks.
So it's going to be someone disabling this for end users.
If there’s a path to profitability, great for them, and for me too; because it means it won’t be available at no charge.
These kind of technologies are forced on users.
A reliably attestable system has to nail the entire boot chain: BIOS/firmware, bootloader, kernel/initramfs pairs, the `init` process, and the system configuration. Flip a single bit anywhere along the process, and your equipment is now a brick.
Getting all of this right requires deep system knowledge, plus a lot of hair-pulling adjustment, assuming if you still have hair left.
I think this part of Linux has been underrated. TPM is a powerful platform that is universally available, and Linux is the perfect OS to fully utilize it. The need for trust in digital realm will only increase. Who knows, it may even integrate with cryptocurrency or even social platforms. I really wish them a good luck.
I wish you great success
>We are building cryptographically verifiable integrity into Linux systems
I wonder what that means ? It could be a good thing, but I tend to think it could be a privacy nightmare depending on who controls the keys.
It will.
Then just a bit later no movies for you unless you are running a blessed distro. Then Chrome will start reporting to websites that you are this weird guy with a dangerous unlocked distro, so no banking for you. Maybe no government services as well because obviously you are a hacker. Why would you run an unlocked linux if you were not?
Somebody will use it and eventually force it if it exists and I don't think gaming especially those requiring anti-cheat is worth that risk.
If that means linux will not be able to overtake window's market share, that's ok. At-least the year of the linux memes will still be funny.
e.g. https://support.faceit.com/hc/en-us/articles/19590307650588-...
> IOMMU is a powerful hardware security feature, which is used to protect your machine from malicious software
The ring-0 anticheat IS that fucking malicious software
(London. On some of my relatives.)
But I'm sure in this case when they achieve some kind of dominant position and Microsoft offers to re-absorb them they will do the honorable thing.
These people don't, but people you've never heard of are always doing honorable things.
Might be some sort of connection there.
You. The money quote about the current state of Linux security:
> In fact, right now, your data is probably more secure if stored on current ChromeOS, Android, Windows or MacOS devices, than it is on typical Linux distributions.
Say what you want about systemd the project but they're the only ones moving foundational Linux security forward, no one else even has the ambition to try. The hardening tools they've brought to Linux are so far ahead of everything else it's not even funny.
That sort of things.
It's not propaganda in any sense, it's recognizing that Linux is behind the state of the art compared to Windows/macOS when it comes to preventing tampering with your OS install. It's not saying you should use Windows, it's saying we should improve the Linux boot process to be a tight security-wise as the Windows boot process along with a long explanation of how we get there.
No, not you. Someone else for you. And that's the scary part.
It's only secure from evil maker attacks if it can be wiped and reinitialised at any time.
Is it possible someone will eventually build a system that doesn't allow this? Yes. Is this influenced in any way by features of Linux software? No.
I hope this never happens. I really want my data secure and I do have something to hide. So, no Microsoft keys on my computer and only I will decide what kind of software I get to run.
Absolutely fuck that.
the guys that copy your bitlocker keys in the clear
As said above, it's about who controls the keys. It's either building your own castle or having to live with the Ultimate TiVo.
We'll see.
Not you. This technology is not being built for you.
I have my reservations, ideas, and what it's supposed to do, but this is not a place to make speculations and to break spirits.
I'll put my criticism out politely when it's time.
Look, I hate systemd just as much as the next guy - but how are you getting "DRM" out of this?
Doing complex flows like "run app to load keys from remote server to unlock encrypted partition" is far easier under systemd and it have dependency system robust enough to trigger that mount automatically if app needing it starts
There are also bad forms of remote attestation (like Google's variant that helps them let banks block you if you are running an alt-os). Those suck and should be rejected.
Edit: bri3d described what I mean better here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46785123
No doubt. Fully agree with you on that. However Intel ME will make sure no system is truly secure and server vendors do add their mandatory own backdoors on top of that (iLO for HP, etc).
Having said that, we must face the reality: this is not being built for you to secure your servers.
Let's say I accept this statement.
What makes you think trusted boot == remote attestation?
No, it's not. (And for that matter, neither is remote attestation)
You're conflating the technology with the use.
I believe that you have only thought about these technologies as they pertain to DRM, now I'm here to tell you there are other valid use cases.
Or maybe your definition of "DRM" is so broad that it includes me setting up my own trusted boot chain on my own hardware? I don't really think that's a productive definition.
This company is explicitly all about implementing remote attestation (which is a form of DRM):
> Remote Attestation of Imutable Operating Systems built on systemd
> Lennart Poettering
Is there a HN full moon out?
Again, this is wrong.
DRM is a policy.
Remote attestation is a technology.
You can use remote attestation to implement DRM.
You can also use remote attestation to implement other things.
They literally don't.
For a decade, I worked on secure boot & attestation for a device that was both:
- firmware updatable - had zero concept or hardware that connected it to anything that could remotely be called a network
The update is predicated on a valid signature.
Would love to hear more of your thoughts on how the users of the device I worked on had their freedom restricted!
I guess my company, the user of the device that I worked on, was being harmed by my company, the creator of the device that I worked on. It's too bad that my company chose to restrict the user's freedom in this way.
Who cares if the application of the device was an industrial control scenario where errors are practically guaranteed to result in the loss of human life, and as a result are incredibly high value targets ala Stuxnet.
No, the users rights to run any code trumps everything! Commercial device or not, ever sold outside of the company or not, terrorist firmware update or not - this right shall not be infringed.
I now recognize I have committed a great sin, and hope you will forgive me.
IMO it's pretty clear that this is a server play because the only place where Linux has enough of a foothold to make client / end-user attestation financially interesting is Android, where it already exists. And to me the server play actually gives me more capabilities than I had: it lets me run my code on cloud provided machines and/or use cloud services with some level of assurance that the provider hasn't backdoored me and my systems haven't been compromised.
It's like designing new kinds of nerve gas, "quite sure" that it will only ever be in the hands of good guys who aren't going to hurt people with it. That's powerful naïveté. Once you make it, you can't control who has it and what they use it for. There's no take-backsies, that's why it should never be created in the first place.
The "bad" version, client attestation, is already implemented on Android, and could be implemented elsewhere but is only a parallel concept.
There is unmet industrial market demand for the (IMO) "not so bad / maybe even good" version, server attestation.
Interesting choice of analogy, to compare something with the singular purpose to destroy biological entities, to a computing technology that enforces what code is run.
Can you not see there might be positive, non-destructive applications of the latter? Are you the type of person that argues cars shouldn't exist due to their negative impacts while ignoring all the positives?
I can see like a 100 ways this can make computing worse for 99% people and like 1-2 scenarios where it might actually be useful.
Like if the politicians pushing for chat control/on device scanning of data come knocking again and actually go through (they can try infinitely) tech like this will really be "useful". Oops your device cannot produce a valid attestation, no internet for you.
---
Making secure boot 100 times simpler would be a deffo plus.
Having said that, should this company not be successful, Mr Zbyszek Jędrzejewski-Szmek has potentially a glowing career as an artists' model. Think Rembrandt sketches.
I look forward to something like ChromeOS that you can just install on any old refurbished laptop. But I think the money is in servers.
One of the most grating pain points of the early versions of systemd was a general lack of humility, some would say rank arrogance, displayed by the project lead and his orbiters. Today systemd is in a state of "not great, not terrible" but it was (and in some circles still is) notorious for breaking peoples' linux installs, their workflows, and generally just causing a lot of headaches. The systemd project leads responded mostly with Apple-style "you're holding it wrong" sneers.
It's not immediately clear to me what exactly Amutable will be implementing, but it smells a lot like some sort of DRM, and my immediate reaction is that this is something that Big Tech wants but that users don't.
My question is this: Has Lennart's attitude changed, or can linux users expect more of the same paternalism as some new technology is pushed on us whether we like it or not?
It improves on about every level compared to what came before. And no, nothing is perfect and you sometimes have to troubleshoot it.
About ten years ago I took a three day cross-country Amtrak trip where I wanted to work on some data analysis that used mysql for its backend. It was a great venue for that sort of work because the lack of train-internet was wonderful to keep me focused. The data I was working with was about 20GB of parking ticket data. The data took a while to process over SQL which gave me the chance to check out the world unfolding outside of the train.
At some point, mysql (well, mariadb) got into a weird state after an unclean shutdown that put itself into recovery mode where upon startup it had to do some disk-intensive cleanup. Thing is -- systemd has a default setting (that's not readily documented, nor sufficiently described in its logs when the behavior happens) that halts the service startup after 30 seconds to try again. On loop.
My troubleshooting attempts were unsuccessful. And since I deleted the original csv files to save disk space, I wasn't able to even poke at the CSV files through python or whatnot.
So instead of doing the analysis I wanted to do on the train, I had to wait until I got to the end of the line to fix it. Sure enough, it was some default 30s timeout that's not explicitly mentioned nor commented out like many services do.
So, saying that things are "much better in every way" really falls on deaf ears and is reminiscent of the systemd devs' dismissive/arrogant behavior that many folk are frustrated about.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1780979
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/a083b4875e8dec5ce5...
That was far from the only time that the systemd developers decided to just break norms or do weird things because they felt like it, and then poorly communicate that change. Change itself is fine, it's how we progress. But part of that arrogance that you mentioned was always framing people who didn't like capricious or poorly communicated changes as being against progress, and that's always been the most annoying part of the whole thing.
How can I cancel a systemd startup task that blocks the login prompt? / how is forcing me to wait for dhcp on a network interface that isn't even plugged in a better experience?
It’s not really the fault of systemd; it just enables new possibilities that were previously difficult/impossible and now the usage of said possibilities is surfacing problems.
On other inits, I can hit ctrl-C to break out of a poorly configured setup. Yes, it's more difficult when there's potentially parallelism. But systemd is not uniformly better than everything else when it lacks interactivity.
And it might not be better than everything else if common distributions set it up wrong because it's difficult to set it up right. If we're willing to discount problems related to one init system because the distribution is holding it wrong, then why don't we blame problems with other init systems on distributions or applications, too? There's no need to restart crashing applications if applications don't crash, etc.
There are serious problems with the systemd paradigm, most of which I couldn't argue for or against. But at least in Void, I can remove network-manger altogether, use cron as I always have, and generally remain free to do as I please until eventually every package there is has systemd dependencies which seems frightfully plausible at this pace.
Void is as good as I could have wanted. If that ever goes, I guess it's either BSD or a cave somewhere.
I'm glad to see the terse questions here. They're well warranted.
of course you can run Cron as well and run all your jobs twice in two different ways, but that's only pedantically possible as it's a completely useless way to do things.
systemd itself only has 2 references to "crontab" in its entire codebase and both of those are in man-pages.
My educated guess is that some other package is installing a generator to generate systemd units out of the crontab (e.g. https://github.com/systemd-cron/systemd-cron)
If systemd-less Linux ever go, there are indeed still the BSDs. But I thought long and hard about this and already did some testing: I used to run Xen back in the early hardware-virt days and nowadays I run Proxmox (still, sadly, systemd-based).
An hypervisor with a VM and GPU passthrough to the VM is at least something too: it's going to be a long long while before people who want to take our ability to control our machines will be able to prevent us from running a minimal hypervisor and then the "real" OS in a VM controlled by the hypervisor.
I did GPU passthrough tests and everything works just fine: be it Linux guests (which I use) or Windows guests (which I don't use).
My "path" to dodge the cave you're talking about is going to involved an hypervisor (atm I'm looking at the FreeBSD's bhyve hypervisor) and then a VM running systemd-less Linux.
And seen that, today, we can run just about every old system under the sun in a VM, I take we'll all be long dead before evil people manage to prevent us from running the Linux we want, the way we want.
You're not alone. And we're not alone.
I simply cannot stand the insufferable arrogance of Agent Poettering. Especially not seen the kitchen sink that systemd is (systemd ain't exactly a homerun and many are realizing that fact now).
System shutdown/reboot is now unreliable. Sometimes it will be just as quick as it was before systemd arrived, but other times, systemd will decide that something isn't to its liking, and block shutdown for somewhere between 30 seconds and 10 minutes, waiting for something that will never happen. The thing in question might be different from one session to the next, and from one systemd version to the next; I can spend hours or days tracking down the process/mount/service in question and finding a workaround, only to have systemd hang on something else the next day. It offers no manual skip option, so unless I happen to be working on a host with systemd's timeouts reconfigured to reduce this problem, I'm stuck with either forcing a power-off or having my time wasted.
Something about systemd's meddling with cgroups broke the lxc control commands a few years back. To work around the problem, I have to replace every such command I use with something like `systemd-run --quiet --user --scope --property=Delegate=yes <command>`. That's a PITA that I'm unlikely to ever remember (or want to type) so I effectively cannot manage containers interactively without helper scripts any more. It's also a new systemd dependency, so those helper scripts now also need checks for cgroup version and systemd presence, and a different code path depending on the result. Making matters worse, that systemd-run command occasionally fails even when I do everything "right". What was once simple and easy is now complex and unreliable.
At some point, Lennart unilaterally decided that all machines accessed over a network must have a domain name. Subsequently, every machine running a distro that had migrated to systemd-resolved was suddenly unable to resolve its hostname-only peers on the LAN, despite the DNS server handling them just fine. Finding the problem, figuring out the cause, and reconfiguring around it wasn't the end of the world, but it did waste more of my time. Repeating that experience once or twice more when systemd behavior changed again and again eventually drove me to a policy of ripping out systemd-resolved entirely on any new installation. (Which, of course, takes more time.) I think this behavior may have been rolled back by now, but sadly, I'll never get my time back.
There are more examples, but I'm tired of re-living them and don't really want to write a book. I hope these few are enough to convey my point:
Systemd has been a net negative in my experience. It has made my life markedly worse, without bringing anything I needed. Based on conversations, comments, and bug reports I've seen over the years, I get the impression that many others have had a similar experience, but don't bother speaking up about it any more, because they're tired of being dismissed, ignored, or shouted down, just as I am.
I would welcome a reliable, minimal, non-invasive, dependency-based init. Systemd is not it.
Also trying to use systemd with podman is frustrating as hell. You just cannot run a system service using podman as a non-root user and have it work correctly.
My understanding is quadlet does not solve this, and my options are calling "systemctl --user" or "--userns auto". I would love to be wrong here.
Err... You just need to run `podman-compose systemd`?
I have my entire self-hosted stack running with systemd-controlled Podman, in regular user accounts.
You realize that quite a few senior and experienced developers and devops engineers do not share this view, right?
Of course it will not be answered. And that's exactly an answer to your question.
Why not adopt seL4 like everybody else who is not outright delusional[0][1]?
You're free to root your phone. You're free to run whatever you want. You're just not entitled to have third parties trust that device with their systems and money. Same as you're free to decline STD testing - you just don't get to then demand unprotected sex from partners who require it.
Yeah I know what analogies are.
Why does my bank need to know whether the machine in my hands that is accessing their internet APIs was attested by some uninvolved third party or not?
You know we used to hand people pieces of paper with letters and numbers on them to do payments right? For some reason, calling up my bank on the phone never required complicated security arrangements.
TD Bank never needed to come inspect my phone lines to ensure nobody was listening in.
Instead of securing their systems and working on making it harder to have your accounts taken over (which by the way is a fruitful avenue of computer security with plenty of low hanging fruit) and punishing me for their failures, they want to be able to coerce me to only run certain software on my equipment to receive banking services.
This wasn't necessary for banking for literally thousands of years.
Why now? What justification is there?
A third party attesting my device can only be used to compel me to only use certain devices from certain third parties. The bank is not at all going to care whether I attest to it or not, they are going to care that Google or Microsoft will attest my device.
And for what? To what end? To prevent what alleged harm?
In what specific way does an attested device state make interacting with a publicly facing interface more secure?
It WILL be used to prevent you from being able to run certain code that benefits you at corporation's expense, like ad blockers.
Linux is supposed to be an open community. Who even asked for this?
While the bank use case makes a compelling argument, device attestation won't be used for just banks. It's going to be every god damned thing on the internet. Why? Because why the hell not, it further pushes the costs of doing business of banks/MSPs/email providers/cloud services onto the customer and assigns more of the liabilities.
It will also further the digital divide as there will be zero support for devices that fail attestation at any service requiring it. I used to think that the friction against this technology was overblown, but over the last eighteen months I've come to the conclusion that it is going to be a horrible privacy sucking nightmare wrapped in the gold foil of security.
I've been involved in tech a long, long time. The first thing I'm going to do when I retire is start chucking devices. I'm checking-out, none of this is proving to be worth the financial and privacy costs.
This is not a persuasive argument.
You are also ignoring the fact that YOU can use remote attestation to verify remote computers are running what they say they are.
"I've been involved in tech a long, long time. The first thing I'm going to do when I retire is start chucking devices. I'm checking-out, none of this is proving to be worth the financial and privacy costs."
You actually sound like you are having a nervous breakdown. Perhaps you should take a vacation.
But its a bank, right? Its my money.
If there is real effective market (which is not in any country on Earth, especially for banks), you could say: vote with you money, choose bank which suits you. But it is impossible even with bakery, less with banks on market which is strictly regulated (in part as result of lobbying by established institutions, to protect themselves!).
So, on one hand, I must use banks (I cannot pay for many things in cash, here, where I live most of bars and many shops doesn't accept cash, for example, and it is result of government politics and regulations), and on other hand banks is not seen as essential as access to air and water, they could dictate any terms they want.
I see this situation completely screwed.
And we are discussing this movement here. You know, пive him an inch and he'll take a yard.
"Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither."
avoiding backdoors as a private person you always can only solve with having the hardware at your place, because hardware ALWAYS can have backdoors, because hardware vendors do not fix their shit.
From my point of view it ONLY gives control and possibilities to large organizations like governments and companies. which in turn use it to control citizens
There is: corporate will fund this project and enforce its usage for their users not for the sake of the users and not for the sake of doing any good.
What it will be used for is to bring you a walled garden into Linux and then slowly incentivize all software vendors to only support that variety of Linux.
LP has a vast, vast experience in locking down users' freedom and locking down Linux.
I'd really love to see this scenario actually explained. The only place I could really see client-side desktop Linux remote attestation gaining any foothold is to satisfy anti-cheat for gaming, which might actually be a win in many ways.
> What it will be used for is to bring you a walled garden into Linux and then slowly incentivize all software vendors to only support that variety of Linux.
What walled garden? Where is the wall? Who owns the garden? What is the actual concrete scenario here?
> LP has a vast, vast experience in locking down users' freedom and locking down Linux.
What? You can still use all of the Linuxes you used to use? systemd is open source, open-application, and generally useful?
Like, I guess I could twist my brain into a vision where each Ubuntu release becomes an immutable rootfs.img and everyone installs overlays over the top of that, and maybe there's a way to attest that you left the integrity protection on, but I don't really see where this goes past that. There's no incentive to keep you from turning the integrity protection off (and no means to do so on PC hardware), and the issues in Android-land with "typical" vendors wanting attestation to interact with you are going to have to come to MacOS and Windows years before they'll look at Linux.
So, some of the people doing "typical HN rage-posting about DRM" are also absolutely right.
The capabilities locking down macOS and iOS and related hardware also can be used for good, but they are not used for that.
What do you mean by this?
Is the concern that systemd is suddenly going to require that users enable some kind of attestation functionality? That making attestation possible or easier is going to cause third parties to start requiring it for client machines running Linux? This doesn't even really seem to be a goal; there's not really money to be made there.
As far as I can tell the sales pitch here is literally "we make it so you can assure the machines running in your datacenter are doing what they say they are," which seems pretty nice to me, and the perversions of this to erode user rights are either just as likely as they ever were or incredibly strange edge cases.
So, every PC sold to consumers is sanctioned by Microsoft. This list contains Secure Boot and TPM based requirements, too.
If Microsoft decides to eliminate enrollment of user keys and Secure Boot toggle, they can revoke current signing keys for "shims" and force Linux distributions to go full immutable to "sign" their bootloaders so they can boot. As said above, it's not something Amutable can control, but enable by proxy and by accident.
Look, I work in a datacenter, with a sizeable fleet. Being able to verify that fleet is desirable for some kinds of operations, I understand that. On the other hand, like every double edged sword, this can cut in both ways.
I just want to highlight that, that's all.
Now we have immutable distributions (SuSE, Fedora, NixOS). We have the infrastructure for attestation (systemd's UKI, image based boot, and other immutability features), TPMs and controversially uutils (Which is MIT licensed and has the stated goal to replace all GNU userspace).
You can build an immutable and adversarial userspace where you don't have to share the source, and require every boot and application call to attest. The theoretical thickness of the wall is both much greater and this theoretical state is much easier to achieve.
20 years ago the only barrier was booting. After that everything was free. Now it's possible to boot into a prison where your every ls and cd command can be attested.
Oh, Rust is memory safe. Good luck finding holes.
What? As just one example, dm-verity was merged into the mainline kernel 13 years ago. I built immutable, verified Linux systems at least ten years ago, and it was considered old hat by the time I got there.
> The best you could do was, TiVoization, but that would be too obvious and won't fly.
What does this even mean? "TiVoization" is the slang for "you get a device that runs Linux, you get the GPL sources, but you can't flash your own image on the device because you don't own the keys." This is the exact same problem then as it was now and just as "obvious?"
I understand the fears that come from client attestation (certainly, the way it has been used on Android has been majorly detrimental to non-Google ROMs), but, to the Android point, the groundwork has always been there.
I'd be very annoyed if someone showed up and said "we're making a Linux-based browser attestation system that your bank is going to partner on," but nobody has even gone this direction on Windows yet.
> Oh, Rust is memory safe. Good luck finding holes.
I break secure boot systems for a living and I'd say _maybe_ half of the bugs I find relate to memory safety in a way Rust would fix. A lot of systems already use tools which provide very similar safety guarantees to Rust for single threaded code. Systems are definitely getting more secure and I do worry about impenetrable fortresses appearing in the near future, but making this argument kind of undermines credibility in this space IMO.
I do think this approach might get used for client attestation in gaming, which I actually don’t mind; renting/non-owning a client that lets me play against non cheaters is a pretty good gaming outcome, and needing a secure configuration to run games seems like a fine trade for me (vs for example needing a secure desktop configuration to access my bank, which would be irksome).
and each time the doors have been blasted wide off by huge security vulnerabilities
the attack surface is simply too large when people can execute their own code nearby
You will get 10000 zero days before you get a single direct attack at hardware
1. How will the company make money? (You have probably been asked that a million times :).)
2. Similar to the sibling: what are the first bits that you are going to work on.
At any rate, super cool and very nice that you are based in EU/Germany/Berlin!
2. Given the team, it should be quite obvious there will be a Linux-based OS involved.
Our aims are global but we certainly look forward to playing an important role in the European tech landscape.
I have no more information about your product that you have shared but I'm already scared and extremely pessimistic given the team and the ambition.
I take it that you are not at this stage able to provide details of the nature of the path to revenue. On what kind of timescale do you envisage being able to disclose your revenue stream/subscribers/investors?
As I understand it, the main customers for this sort of thing are companies making Tivo-style products - where they want to use Linux in their product, but they want to lock it down so it can't be modified by the device owner.
This can be pretty profitable; once your customers have rolled out a fleet of hardware locked down to only run kernels you've signed.
That is why Ubuntu Core (and similar) exist. More secure, better update strategy, lower net cost. I don't agree with the licensing or pricing model, but there are perfectly good technical reasons to use it.
A "robust path to revenue" plus a Linux-based OS and a strong emphasis on EU / German positioning immediately triggers some concern. We've seen this pattern before: wrap a commercially motivated control layer in the language of sovereignty, security, or European tech independence, and hope that policymakers, enterprises, and users don't look too closely at the tradeoffs.
Europe absolutely needs stronger participation in foundational tech, but that shouldn't mean recreating the same centralized trust and control models that already failed elsewhere, just with an EU flag on top. 'European sovereignty' is not inherently better if it still results in third-party gatekeepers deciding what hardware, kernels, or systems are "trusted."
Given Europe's history with regulation-heavy, vendor-driven solutions, it's fair to ask:
Who ultimately controls the trust roots?
Who decides policy when commercial or political pressure appears?
What happens when user interests diverge from business or state interests?
Linux succeeded precisely because it avoided these dynamics. Attestation mechanisms that are tightly coupled to revenue models and geopolitical branding risk undermining that success, regardless of whether the company is based in Silicon Valley or Berlin.
Hopefully this is genuinely about user-verifiable security and not another marketing-driven attempt to position control as sovereignty. Healthy skepticism seems warranted until the governance and trust model are made very explicit.
I want to know if they raised VC money or not.
Either way at least it isn't anything about AI and has something to do with hard cryptography.
The systemd crowd are perhaps worse than GNOME, as regards "my way or the highway", and designing systems that are fundamentally inadequate for the general use-case. I don't think ethnicity or gender diversity quotas would substantially improve their decision-making: all it would really achieve is to make it harder to spot the homogeneity in a photograph. A truly diverse team wouldn't make the decisions they make.
I'm interested in what Amutable is building, but I'm personally uneasy about Lennart Poettering being involved. This isn't about denying his technical ability or past impact. My concern is more about the social/maintenance dynamics that have repeatedly shown up around some of the projects he's led in the Linux ecosystem - highly centralizing designs, big changes quickly landing in core technology, and the kind of communication/governance style that at times left downstream maintainers and parts of the community feeling steamrolled rather than brought along. I've watched enough of those cycles to be wary when the same leadership style shows up again, especially in something that might become infrastructure people depend on.
To keep this constructive: for folks who've followed his work more closely than I have, do you think those past community frictions were mostly a function of the environment (big distro politics, legacy constraints, etc), or are they intrinsic to how he approaches projects? And for people evaluating Amutable today, what signals would you look for to distinguish "strong technical leadership" from "future maintenance and ecosystem headaches" ?
If anyone from the company is reading, I'd be genuinely reassured by specifics like:
- a clear governance/decision process (who can say "no", how major changes are reviewed)
- a commitment to compatibility and migration paths (not just "it's better, switch")
- transparent security and disclosure practices
- a plan for collaboration with downstream parties and competitors (standards, APIs, interop)
I realize this is partly subjective. I’m posting because I expect I'm not the only one weighing "technical upside" against "community cost," and I'd like to hear how others are thinking about it.
Why should we trust microsofties to produce something secure and non-backdoored?
And, lastly, why should Linux's security be tied to a private company? Oooh, but it's of course not about security: it's about things like DRM.
I hope Linus doesn't get blinded here: systemd managed to get PID 1 on many distros but they thankfully didn't manage, yet, to control the kernel. I hope this project ain't the final straw to finally meddle into the kernel.
Currently I'm doing:
Proxmox / systemd-less VMs / containers
So my plan is:
FreeBSD / bhyve hypervisor / systemd-less Linux VMs / containers
This project is an attack on general-purpose computing.
Imagine you're using a program hosted on some cloud service S. You send packets over the network; gears churn; you get some results back. What are the problems with such a service? You have no idea what S is doing with your data. You incur latency, transmission time, and complexity costs using S remotely. You pay, one way or another, for the infrastructure running S. You can't use S offline.
Now imagine instead of S running on somebody else's computer over a network, you run S on your computer instead. Now, you can interact with S with zero latency, don't have to pay for S's infrastructure, and you can supervise S's interaction with the outside world.
But why would the author of S agree to let you run it? S might contain secrets. S might enforce business rules S's author is afraid you'll break. Ordinarily, S's authors wouldn't consider shipping you S instead of S's outputs.
However --- if S's author could run S on your computer in such a way that he could prove you haven't tampered with S or haven't observed its secrets, he can let you run S on your computer without giving up control over S. Attestation, secure enclaves, and other technologies create ways to distribute software that otherwise wouldn't exist. How many things are in the cloud solely to enforce access control? What if they didn't have to be?
Sure, in this deployment model, just like in the cloud world, you wouldn't be able to run a custom S: but so what? You don't get to run your custom S either way, and this way, relative to cloud deployment, you get better performance and even a little bit more control.
Also, the same thing works in reverse. You get to run your code remotely in a such a way that you can trust its remote execution just as much as you can trust that code executing on your own machine. There are tons of applications for this capability that we're not even imagining because, since the dawn of time, we've equated locality with trust and can now, in principle, decouple the two.
Yes, bad actors can use attestation technology to do all sorts of user-hostile things. You can wield any sufficiently useful tool in a harmful way: it's the utility itself that creates the potential for harm. This potential shouldn't prevent our inventing new kinds of tool.
But it won't be used like that. It will be used to take user freedoms out.
> But why would the author of S agree to let you run it? S might contain secrets. S might enforce business rules S's author is afraid you'll break. Ordinarily, S's authors wouldn't consider shipping you S instead of S's outputs.
That use case you're describing is already there and is currently being done with DRM, either in browser or in app itself.
You are right in the "it will make easier for app user to do it", and in theory it is still better option in video games than kernel anti-cheat. But it is still limiting user freedoms.
> Yes, bad actors can use attestation technology to do all sorts of user-hostile things. You can wield any sufficiently useful tool in a harmful way: it's the utility itself that creates the potential for harm. This potential shouldn't prevent our inventing new kinds of tool.
Majority of the uses will be user-hostile things. Because those are only cases where someone will decide to fund it.
To be honest, mainly companies need that. personal users do not need that. And additionally companies are NOT restrained by governments not to exploit customers as much as possible.
So... i also see it as enslaving users. And tell me, for many private persons, where does this actually give them for PRIVATE persons, NOT companies a net benefit?
> This potential shouldn't prevent our inventing new kinds of tool.
Why do i see someone who wants to build an atomic bomb for shit and giggles using this argument, too? As hyperbole as my argument is, the argument given is not good here, as well.
The immutable linux people build tools, without building good tools which actually make it easier for private people at home to adapt a immutable linux to THEIR liking.
In my personal philosophy, it is never bad to develop a new technology.
"Trust us" is never a good idea with profit seeking founders. Especially ones who come from a culture that generally hates the hacker spirit and general computing.
You basically wrote a whole narrative of things that could be. But the team is not even willing to make promises as big as yours. Their answers were essentially just "trust us we're cool guys" and "don't worry, money will work out" wrapped in average PR speak.
Not just can. They will use it.
Community ran servers with community administration who actually cared about showing up and removing bad actors and cheaters.
Plenty of communities are still demonstrating this exact fact today.
Companies could 100% recreate this solution with fully hosted servers, with an actually staffed moderation department, but that slightly reduces profit margins so fuck you. Keep in mind community servers ran on donations most of the time. That's the level of profit they would lose.
Companies completely removed community servers as an option instead, because allowing you to run your own servers means you could possibly play the game with skins you haven't paid for!!! Oh no!!! Getting enjoyment without paying for it!!!
All software attempts at anti-cheat are impossible. Even fully attested consoles have had cheats and other ways of getting an advantage that you shouldn't have.
Cheating isn't defined by software. Cheating is a social problem that can only be solved socially. The status quo 20 years ago was better.
In that world, authoring technology that enables this even more is either completely mad or evil. To me Linux is not a technological object, it is also a political statement. It is about choice, personal freedom, acceptance of risk. If you build software that actively intends to take this away from me to put it into the hands of economic interests and political actors then you deserve all the hate you can get.
I use Linux since the Slackware day. Poettering is the worse thing that happened to the Linux ecosystem and, of course, he went on to work for Microsoft. Just to add a huge insult to the already painful injury.
This is not about security for the users. It's about control.
At least many in this thread are criticizing the project.
And, once again of course, it's from a private company.
Full of ex-Microsofties.
I don't know why anyone interested in hacking would cheer for this. But then maybe HN should be renamed "CN" (Corporate News) or "MN" (Microsoft News).
Same here, Linux since about 1995. Same opinion.
> And, once again of course, it's from a private company. Full of ex-Microsofties.
And funded. And confident they will sell the product well.
agreed, and now he's planning on controlling what remains of your machine cryptographically!
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18321884
- Linux is better now
- Nothing bad